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The Digital Samaritans 
Eldar Haber* 
Abstract 
Bystanderism is becoming largely digital. If being subjected 
to perilous situations was once reserved almost solely for the 
physical world, individuals now might witness those in peril 
digitally from afar via online livestreams. New technological 
developments in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) might also 
expand bystanderism to new fields, whereby machines—not just 
humans—are gradually positioned to better compute their 
surroundings, thus potentially being capable of reaching a high 
statistical probability that a perilous situation is currently 
taking place in their vicinity. This current and future expansion 
of bystanderism into the digital world forms a rather new type of 
digital bystander that might challenge the legal and social 
meaning of bad Samaritan laws—legal duties to act on the 
behalf of others in a perilous situation by reporting the events or 
aiding those in the perilous situation, when the burden or risk of 
such aid is low. With the rise in the availability of livestreaming 
crimes on social media platforms, and the rise in AI capabilities, 
the current legal framework that governs bad Samaritans might 
become inappropriate in regulating social behavior and personal 
safety, which in turn might shift to the almost sole prerogative of 
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platform governance—transforming online users and platforms 
into becoming the new digital Samaritans. 
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I.  Introduction 
Bystander intervention is not rooted within common law 
jurisprudence.1 With some exceptions, individuals in society are 
not generally obliged to aid or rescue others in perilous 
situations, even if the burden or risk of such aid is perceived to 
be low, as common law does not impose liability for 
nonfeasance.2 Triggered by the public’s moral outcry over 
media-reported events, whereby eyewitnesses of horrific crimes 
did not report or aid the victims, state legislators responded to 
bystander intervention in the form of bad Samaritan laws.3 
These laws were crafted generally to impose affirmative 
requirements on individuals to assist others in perilous 
 
 1. See Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 
26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 423, 424 (1985) (“With limited exceptions, there is no 
duty under Anglo-American law to lend personal assistance or to obtain help 
for persons in distress, or to warn of imminent danger.”).  
 2. See id. (explaining that under U.S. law even an “expert swimmer, 
with a boat and a rope in hand” need not rescue a person who he sees drowning 
in front of him). 
 3. See infra note 34 and accompanying text for a discussion of public 
outcry prompting legislatures to adopt bad Samaritan laws.  
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situations or notify enforcement agencies, as long as the 
reporter or rescuer lacks any associated risks with such duty.4 
Recent technological developments, however, might alter 
the ways individuals are subjected to criminal activities or other 
perilous situations in real time. As many social media platforms 
have enabled users to livestream almost any aspect of their 
lives, it was only a matter of time until numerous individuals 
took advantage of this technological feature to communicate 
violent criminal conduct, such as rape, assault, murder, and 
mass massacres, to name but a few examples.5 If witnessing 
crimes was once solely confined to the kinetic realm, requiring 
physical presence of the spectator, the emergence of these 
livestreaming crimes challenges this notion. And this might only 
be the beginning, as bystanderism might soon also extend into 
the realm of machines as well.6 With advancements in the field 
of artificial intelligence (AI), potential new forms of Samaritans 
may emerge as these AI-based devices might reach 
computational abilities to detect perilous situations in real time, 
and aside from gathering evidence for potential future 
proceedings, will be positioned to render aid from enforcement 
agencies directly.7 
These current and potential technological developments 
create new categories of digital Samaritans—online and 
artificial ones.8 Online bystanders are those individuals that 
either communicate or view perilous situations like 
livestreaming crimes—thus representing the current state of 
technology in this respect.9 The second type of potential digital 
Samaritans, artificial bystanders, refers to AI-based devices and 
services that use their sensors and advanced speech recognition 
 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. See, e.g., Christine Hauser, In Connecticut Murder Case, a Fitbit is a 
Silent Witness, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/BCB3-X8NW 
(noting that in this homicide case the victim’s movements tracked on her Fitbit 
“may be the key to solving her murder”).  
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Parts III.A–B. 
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and machine learning algorithms to accurately assess perilous 
situations like criminal activities that involve victims.10 
This new form of digital Samaritans raises a host of legal, 
social, and moral questions. In the context of Samaritan laws, 
they require reevaluating the current legal and moral duties 
and perceptions imposed on individuals in society, and AI 
services, to render assistance for those in distress or in perilous 
situations, by reporting it or aiding those in peril in any other 
way.11 Should policymakers react to these new forms of 
subjection to perilous situations like livestreaming crimes or the 
potential ability of machines to safeguard individuals’ personal 
safety? And if so, how? Can the current legal framework of bad 
Samaritan laws, in states where applicable, be applied to this 
new form of Samaritans? What are the benefits and drawbacks 
of imposing such affirmative duties on online users and 
platforms, especially within the context of civil rights and 
liberties? And what are the broader normative consequences of 
the state’s current reluctance to interfere in regulating online 
platforms directly in this respect—thereby triggering a 
social-technological-legal debate on the proper scope and 
ramifications of platform governance, and its potential 
reconstruction of democratic values and individuals’ civil rights 
and liberties? 
This Article addresses these and other timely questions 
regarding the role of both individuals and platforms to serve as 
digital Samaritans, thereby aiding members of society in 
perilous situations, while further broadening the emerging 
scholarly discussion on platform governance in general. It 
proceeds as follows. Part II traces the historical roots of bad 
Samaritan laws, while further differentiating and evaluating 
different duties that the law currently imposes on bystanders in 
the kinetic world. Part III introduces and discusses the 
proclaimed movement towards digital Samaritans. This Part is 
further divided into two, differentiating between online and 
artificial Samaritans, while respectively evaluating the 
plausibility and desirability of imposing affirmative duties to 
report or assist in the digital era. Part IV zooms out to discuss 
 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
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the rise of platform governance in shaping the moral duties of 
society, and the potential roles these platforms might assume in 
public enforcement. It argues that while the law should play a 
limited role in the shaping of digital Samaritan duties, the rise 
of platform governance, especially in the realm of public 
enforcement, could highly endanger democratic values and 
must be better confined by both policymakers and users. The 
final Part summarizes the discussion and further warns against 
the unregulated shaping of human rights and liberties by online 
platforms. 
II.  Good and Bad Samaritan Laws 
Common law does not generally impose any duties on 
individuals to act on behalf of others in peril.12 Tracing its 
historical roots, common law rationale was to impose liability 
only for malfeasance but not for nonfeasance.13 There was no 
general duty to assist or rescue others, albeit with a few 
exceptions in instances of special relationships between the 
person in peril and the bystander.14 Accordingly, and within the 
context of criminal law, the initial federal criminal code did not 
impose duties on individuals for not reporting perilous 
 
 12. In the words of William L. Prosser, describing the lack of a legal duty 
under Anglo-American law: “The expert swimmer, with a boat and a rope at 
hand, who sees another drowning before his eyes, is not required to do 
anything at all about it, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigarette, and 
watch the man drown.” Silver, supra note 1, at 424 (citing W. PROSSER & W. 
KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984)); see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
CRIMINAL LAW 215 (3d ed. 2000) (“A moral duty to take affirmative action is 
not enough to impose a legal duty to do so.”); Melody J. Stewart, How Making 
the Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An Observation of Expanding 
Criminal Omission Liability, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 385, 387 (1998) (“[T]he 
common law rule regarding omission liability imposes no general legal duty or 
obligation upon one to act on behalf of anyone in peril.”). 
 13. See Jessica R. Givelber, Note, Imposing Duties on Witnesses to Child 
Sexual Abuse: A Futile Response to Bystander Indifference, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 3169, 3173 (1999) (“[A]bsent a special relationship, an individual has no 
affirmative legal duty to rescue another person in a perilous situation.”). 
 14. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 
247, 247 (1980) (“This general rule rests on the law’s distinction between the 
infliction of harm and the failure to prevent it.”). 
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situations, and more specifically, crimes.15 With some 
exceptions,16 crime control at that time was reserved solely for 
federal and state agencies—generally excluding other members 
of society.17 In other words, while assistance to those in distress 
could stem from a religious view or moral codes,18 it was not 
generally a legal duty in common law jurisdictions.19 
Modern embodiments of these then-mostly religious and 
moral codes first emerged in medieval Europe, initially within 
limited instances like common disasters, only to be later 
expanded during the nineteenth century to criminal duties to 
 
 15. See Matthew R. Hall, Note, An Emerging Duty to Report Criminal 
Conduct: Banks, Money Laundering, and the Suspicious Activity Report, 84 
KY. L.J. 643, 643 (1995) (“[W]hile a misprision of felony statute has appeared 
in the United States criminal code since 1790, the courts have interpreted that 
law to punish active concealment rather than passive non-reporting.”). 
 16. Scholars argued that common law did impose a legal duty to prevent 
a felony in the mid-thirteenth century, among other related duties. See 
Givelber, supra note 13, at 3175–76.  
 17. Cf. Sandra Guerra Thompson, The White-Collar Police Force: “Duty 
to Report” Statutes in Criminal Law Theory, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 3, 8 
(2002) (“[The] latest reactions to the child abuse scandals in the Catholic 
Church highlight the tendency legislators have shown to respond to such 
crises by requiring people in certain professions to report suspicions of 
criminality to the police.”). 
 18. Compare Zachary D. Kaufman, Protectors of Predators or Prey: 
Bystanders and Upstanders Amid Sexual Crimes, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1317, 
1335–36 (2019) (tracing the religious and moral codes within faiths such as 
Christianity, Islam, and Judaism; and discussing scholars like Jeremy 
Bentham Burke, Cicero, Dante, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Elie Wiesel), 
with Heather Benzmiller, Note, The Cyber-Samaritans: Exploring Criminal 
Liability for the “Innocent” Bystanders of Cyberbullying, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
927, 944 (2013) (tracing civilian duties to rescue and report within ancient 
Egypt, Plato’s Laws, and Ancient German laws). 
 19. See, e.g., Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 811 (N.H. 1898) (“The 
duty to protect against wrong is, generally speaking and excepting certain 
intimate relations in the nature of a trust, a moral obligation only, not 
recognized or enforced by law.”); Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928) 
(holding that a boat rental business was not liable for not aiding its drowning); 
Natalie Perrin-Smith Vance, Comment, My Brother’s Keeper? The 
Criminalization of Nonfeasance: A Constitutional Analysis of Duty to Report 
Statutes, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 135, 138 (1999) (“Historically, there has never 
been a legal penalty for failing to come to the aid of others in the United 
States.”).  
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report in some European nations.20 These then-new legal codes 
sparked much discussion, and academics began to focus 
attention on the potential role that witnesses of perilous 
situations might and should play.21 Subsequently, several 
policymakers in non-Continental legal systems began to follow 
suit by imposing limited duties to assist law enforcement 
agencies on those who hold certain professions, likely to obtain 
information about certain crimes or misconduct.22 Under this 
rationale, physicians might be required to report gunshot and 
knife wounds or report child and elder abuse or neglect.23 Even 
parking garage owners might be obliged to report bullet holes in 
cars.24 In these instances, the state imposes duties to report 
potential criminal activity in specific circumstances when 
special relationships between individuals exist.25 
 
 20. See Benzmiller, supra note 18, at 944  
During the nineteenth century, many European nations began to 
enact criminal causes of action based upon violations of the duty to 
rescue. By the turn of the twentieth century, roughly half of the 
continental legal systems recognized a general duty to rescue in 
criminal law. And in the twentieth century, European civil law 
jurisdictions began to embrace broader formulations of the duty to 
rescue. 
 21. See, e.g., James B. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 
111– 13 (1908) (“One who fails to intervene to save another from impending 
death or great bodily harm, follows as a consequence of his inaction, shall be 
punished criminally.”); Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a 
Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 220 (1908) (“The difference 
between non-feasance and misfeasance while quite fundamental, is much less 
obvious. The final physical injury to the plaintiff may be the same whether 
defendant’s alleged misconduct is an act of violence or a failure to protect him 
from the violence of others.”). 
 22. Health professionals can serve as a good example, as they might 
encounter gunshot wounds, injuries, or other health issues related to violent 
crimes. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 9–10. 
 23. See Hall, supra note 15, at 645–46 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 
(West 2020) as one statute imposing such requirements). 
 24. See id. at 646 (citing 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-26-12 (2020) as one 
statute imposing such an obligation). 
 25. These special relationships relate often to the establishment of a 
reasonable care duty, e.g., between students and schools; employees and 
employers; tenants and landlords; children and parents; or other related 
professional duties. See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A 
Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. 
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Still, such duties were rather limited as opposed to many 
countries with civil law jurisdictions,26 as common law solely 
imposed a limited duty to report obligation in special 
relationships of dependence;27 in contractual agreements;28 
when the bystander placed someone in the perilous situation;29 
by specific statutes;30 or in other limited circumstances.31 
While bystander intervention was not, to begin with, 
acknowledged as a legal duty,32 it has since expanded rapidly to 
be mandatory in many common law jurisdictions (at first only 
in special relationships), imposing direct liability on those who 
 
L.Q. 1, 9–10 (1993) (listing and exemplifying special relationships that create 
a legal duty to assist, like parent-child); Jay Logan Rogers, Note, Testing the 
Waters for an Arizona Duty-to-Rescue Law, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 897, 898 (2014) 
(noting that common law jurisprudence does not establish a duty to rescue 
imperiled strangers). There are also specific acts that impose duties to report 
in various contexts of special relationships, such as suspected child abuse. See 
34 U.S.C. § 20341 (requiring certain professionals who learn of child abuse to 
report). 
 26. See Rogers, supra note 25, at 900–01 (“[C]ontinental Europe has 
taken a different approach, and several nations impose legal penalties on 
nonrescuers.”). 
 27. See Silver, supra note 1, at 425–26 (“These ‘special relationships’ 
include parent to child, spouse to spouse, common carrier to passenger, 
innkeeper to guest, storekeeper to customer, host to social guest, employer to 
employee, teacher or school official to student, and jailer to inmate.”). 
 28. These could include, inter alia, lifeguards who are contractually 
obliged to rescue people from drowning, as well as “[f]iremen, police, nurses, 
baby-sitters, and many others [who] enter into agreements that require them 
to render aid.” Id. at 426.  
 29. See Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 138 (noting that an 
exception to the common law nonfeasance rule has been made where the 
accused put the victim in peril). 
 30. See Benzmiller, supra note18, at 945 (observing that American courts 
have traditionally been resistant to impose affirmative duties on bystanders 
unless those duties arose by special relationship, by contract, or by statute). 
These statutes could include, inter alia, “hit and run” laws and regulations 
that require drivers involved in an automobile accident to give assistance to 
those injured, regardless of fault. See Silver, supra note 1, at 425. 
 31. See Silver, supra note 1, at 426 (reporting that “one who negligently 
injures or imperils another has a duty to render reasonable assistance” and 
that “one who volunteers aid is under a duty to exercise reasonable care”). 
 32. See Damien Schiff, Samaritans: Good, Bad and Ugly: A Comparative 
Law Analysis, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 77, 83 (2005) (“At common law 
no such duty developed.”). 
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were simply eyewitnesses or became aware of certain felonies 
and did not report the crime or assist the victims.33 Perhaps also 
partially influenced by global movements, these laws were 
mostly triggered by specific events—often a crime committed 
while bystanders had the riskless ability to report or aid the 
victim and did not—which led to public outcry to amend the 
law.34  These laws are now articulated as “Samaritan laws,”35 
regulating bystander intervention in perilous situations.36 
 
 33. See id. at 81–88 (summarizing the historical development of legal 
duties imposed on bystanders in American jurisprudence); Thompson, supra 
note 17, at 11 (explaining the duties modern reporting statutes impose on 
individuals who obtain knowledge of information relating to the commission 
of certain offenses). 
 34. Many Samaritan laws emerged from specific cases that engendered 
public outrage. Perhaps the most highly publicized example, also sparking the 
first legislative response, is that of the murder of Kitty Genovese in New York 
City, where media reports indicated that thirty-eight witnesses of the crime 
did not report it to the police or attempt to aid her in any other way. Martin 
Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 
1964, at 1. Some, however, argue that this incident was highly exaggerated or 
even close to a myth. See, e.g., Bertrand Crettez & Regis Deloche, On the 
Optimality of a Duty-to-Rescue Rule and the Cost of Wrongful Intervention, 31 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 263, 263 n.2 (2011). Notably, the murder of Kitty 
Genovese also led to a new field of research in the psychology of prosocial 
behavior. See PATRICIA WALLACE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTERNET 191 (2d 
ed. 2016). Another example is that of the “Steubenville rape,” where reports 
indicated that bystanders did not intervene while witnessing the sexual 
assault of a sixteen-year-old girl. See, e.g., Maia Szalavitz, What Bystanders 
Can Do to Stop Rape, TIME (Jan. 11, 2013), https://perma.cc/A6SE-TVZK; 
Sarah L. Swan, Bystander Interventions, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 975, 984 n.37 
(noting that the “Steubenville rape” was a high-profile case which brought the 
“bystander effect” to the forefront of public attention). The final example is 
that of the state of California, which introduced a bad Samaritan law as a 
response to a horrific event that occurred in the women’s restroom of a Las 
Vegas casino: reports indicated that a seven-year-old girl was sexually 
assaulted and strangled to death in the restroom, while videos from security 
cameras showed that two potential observers did not come to her rescue or 
report this event. See Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 135 (describing 
the factual details of the incident). 
 35. See Stewart, supra note 12, at 388 n.9 (discussing the origin of the 
reference to “Samaritans” in this context, drawn from a New Testament Bible 
parable in the book of Luke in which a beaten man was eventually assisted by 
a person who lived in or came from Samaria). 
 36. See id. at 388 (“In an attempt to encourage people . . . to assist others 
in peril while leaving undisturbed the common law no-duty rule, legislatures 
began to enact Good Samaritan laws.”). 
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Literature divides Samaritan laws into two groups— often 
labeling the Samaritan as either being “good” or “bad.”37 Good 
Samaritan laws generally fall under the rubric of tort law, 
providing some form of civil immunity from liability to 
individuals who render aid to another person,38 seemingly 
injured or in threat of such injury, as long as such aid is not 
proven to be highly negligent or conducted in a reckless 
manner.39 Bad Samaritan laws—the focus of this Article—are 
different in nature.40 Falling mainly under the rubric of criminal 
law and relying mainly on the moral duty of individuals to aid 
others in grave danger, bad Samaritan laws impose one of two 
legal duties: to report or to offer rescue in perilous 
situations— often cases of felony—while the burden of risk of 
 
 37. See, e.g., Schiff, supra note 32, at 81–88 (discussing the history and 
development of Samaritan laws and differentiating between those that impose 
an affirmative duty to assist (bad) and those that protect individuals rendering 
assistance to others (good)). 
 38. In some cases, good Samaritan laws will only apply in specific 
circumstances. One example is that of good Samaritan laws that apply solely 
to medical aid: one famous case involved a woman who caused permanent 
damage to her friend’s spinal cord while removing her from a car following an 
accident. See Van Horn v. Watson, 197 P.3d 164, 165 (Cal. 2008). The woman 
was held liable in this instance, as the applicable good Samaritan law 
protected only those granting medical aid. See id. at 171; see also Mueller v. 
McMillan Warner Ins., 714 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Wis. 2006) (affirming the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ reversal of summary judgment granted in favor 
of defendant parents because the injurious care they provided to the plaintiff 
was not “emergency care,” and because the relevant good Samaritan statute 
did not immunize non-emergency care). For other judicial decisions in the 
context of good Samaritans, see Swan, supra note 34, at 1024–26. 
 39. See Patricia Grande Montana, Watch or Report? Livestream or Help? 
Good Samaritan Laws Revisited: The Need to Create a Duty to Report, 66 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 533, 537 (2018) (defining the typical characteristics of good 
Samaritan laws). For more on good Samaritan laws, see generally Eric A. 
Brandt, Comment, Good Samaritan Laws—The Legal Placebo: A Current 
Analysis, 17 AKRON L. REV. 303 (1983); Carl V. Nowlin, Note, Don’t Just Stand 
There, Help Me!: Broadening the Effect of Minnesota’s Good Samaritan 
Immunity Through Swenson v. Waseca Mutual Insurance Co., 30 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1001 (2004). 
 40. See Ken Levy, Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing 
Bad Samaritanism, 44 GA. L. REV. 607, 610 (2010) (describing bad Samaritan 
laws as those under which any individual who could have attempted to save 
an individual in danger or could have notified professional rescuers of her 
plight would have been criminally prosecuted). 
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such aid is low.41 Thus, unlike good Samaritan laws, bad 
Samaritan laws incorporate a duty to directly assist 
others— whether by reporting to authorities or offering 
aid— when another person is in immediate danger, all 
depending on the jurisdiction in question and other various 
circumstances.42 Notably, the duty to rescue is currently more 
limited in scope than the duty to report, existing in only a 
handful of U.S. states43 and often exempting assistance 
requirements when it might jeopardize the rescuer.44 
Bad Samaritan laws, also categorized as bystander 
intervention statutes, vary between legal jurisdictions45 and 
within states.46 Some statutes are more specific in nature, 
 
 41. See Levy, supra note 40, at 617–19 (listing rationales for bad 
Samaritan laws). For more on the moral duty to report crime when costs are 
minimal, see Arthur Ripstein, Three Duties to Rescue: Moral, Civil, and 
Criminal, 19 L. & PHIL. 751, 752–54 (2000). 
 42. See Kaufman, supra note 18, at 1325 (explaining bad Samaritan 
laws); see also Michael Davis, How Much Punishment Does a Bad Samaritan 
Deserve?, 15 L. & PHIL. 93, 93 (1996) (same). 
 43. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2020) (imposing a duty to provide 
reasonable assistance, including obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from 
law enforcement or medical personnel, on an individual who knows that 
another person is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 663-1.6 (2019) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2019) (same); WIS. 
STAT. § 940.34(2)(a) (2020) (same); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-56-1 (2020) 
(same). 
 44. Specifically, while some states impose an affirmative duty to assist 
only when a person’s life, health, or safety is in peril, other states more 
narrowly impose such a duty only when there is danger to life or when specific 
crimes create the peril. See Benzmiller, supra note 18, at 951. In addition, the 
scope of such an affirmative duty could change considering the risks to the 
victim and to the would-be rescuer. See id. 
 45. See Note, The Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLUM. L. 
REV. 631, 639–42 (1952) (describing some of the variations between French 
and Anglo-American legal jurisdictions); Stewart, supra note 12, at 397–404 
(describing variation in judicial treatment of the duty-to-assist among states); 
Kaufman, supra note 18, at 1342–48 (listing domestic and global duty to report 
statutes); Levy, supra note 40, at 616 (listing European countries with bad 
Samaritan laws).  
 46. At least some form of a criminal duty to rescue appears now in most 
Latin American and European countries. See Benzmiller, supra note 18, at 
945. In France, for instance, citizens have the obligation to report all crimes. 
See Edward A. Tomlinson, The French Experience with Duty to Rescue: A 
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dealing solely with certain felonies like sexual violence,47 
physical injuries,48 or murder,49 while others are more general, 
applying to any perilous situation or criminal felony, and even 
failure to report the discovery of a human body.50 Some statutes 
impose a duty only with regard to specific cohorts, for example, 
vulnerable populations like children or the elderly.51 While 
federal law does not currently include a general bad Samaritan 
law provision,52 all states have some form of a good Samaritan 
 
Dubious Case for Criminal Enforcement, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 
451, 482 (2000) (“The [French] courts . . . have always insisted that the 
defendant respond to a known peril in an appropriate fashion.”); see also Code 
pénal [C. pén.] [Penal Code] art. 434-1 (2020) (criminalizing failure to report); 
see generally Kaufman, supra note 18, at 1337–39 (differentiating various 
duty-to-report laws). 
 47. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 794.027 (2020) (“Duty to report sexual battery; 
penalties.”). 
 48. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 604A.01(1) (“A person at the scene of an 
emergency who knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave 
physical harm shall . . . give reasonable assistance to the exposed person.”); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (“A person who knows that another is exposed 
to grave physical harm shall . . . give reasonable assistance to the exposed 
person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others.”). 
 49. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (2020) (“Whoever knows that 
another person is a victim of aggravated rape, rape, murder, manslaughter or 
armed robbery and is at the scene of said crime shall . . . report said crime to 
an appropriate law enforcement official as soon as reasonably practicable.”). 
 50. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(C) (West 2020) (“No person who 
discovers the body or acquires the first knowledge of the death of a person 
shall fail to report the death . . . .”). 
 51. See, e.g., Givelber, supra note 13, at 3180–84 (stating that mandatory 
child abuse reporting statutes exist at least in some form in all fifty states); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3 (West 2020) (“Observation of offenses against 
children.”). 
 52. See Kaufman, supra note 18, at 1344 (“[N]o general Bad Samaritan 
statute exists in U.S. federal law.”). The federal criminal code, however, 
includes some duties which resemble bad Samaritan duties, but are more 
limited in scope. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4 (defining the crime of misprision as 
applying only to an affirmative act of concealment, unlike non-reporting); 18 
U.S.C. § 2258A (duty to report child pornography by electronic communication 
service providers and remote computing service providers); 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) 
(reporting of suspicious activity by financial institutions); 42 U.S.C. § 1986 
(providing an action for neglect to prevent conspiracy). For examples of 
proposed federal laws, see Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 140–41. 
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law,53 and more than half of U.S. states currently have some 
form of a bad Samaritan statute.54 
There are several normative justifications behind bad 
Samaritan laws. To name a few examples,55 some justifications 
are rather utilitarian in scope: that these laws could aid in 
minimizing needless deaths and injuries;56 provide an outlet for 
the public’s moral outrage on specific events;57 enable society to 
formally echo the message that bad Samaritanism is morally 
wrong and that our shared citizenship forms a social 
responsibility for each other;58 promote public safety;59 and 
provide deterrence for non-compliance.60 The underlying 
 
 53. See Montana, supra note 39, at 537 (“All states, including the District 
of Columbia, currently have some form of a Good Samaritan statute.”). 
 54. See Kaufman, supra note 18, at 1345 (“Bad Samaritan laws—whether 
duties to rescue, to report, or either—that do apply to most or all witnesses 
exist in twenty-nine states and Puerto Rico.”). Notably, regulation is not 
limited to the scope of affirmative duties to rescue or report. Some 
policymakers, like the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority and 
the DHS, have also raised public awareness to suspicious activities under their 
“If You See Something, Say Something” campaign. See About the Campaign, 
DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., https://perma.cc/KK85-GS32 (“‘If You See Something, 
Say Something®’ is a national campaign that raises public awareness of the 
indicators of terrorism and terrorism-related crime, as well as the importance 
of reporting suspicious activity to state and local law enforcement.”). 
 55. For a full taxonomy of the rationales behind duty-to-report laws from 
various perspectives, see David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical 
Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REV. 653, 655–56 (2006). 
 56. See Levy, supra note 40, at 627. 
 57. See id. at 627–28. 
 58. Id. at 628–29; see Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to 
Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673, 680 (1994) (“[I]n its fully developed form the 
duty to rescue is . . . a social duty—an obligation owed not only to the 
community itself but also to the other members of that community.”); Shalini 
Bhargava Ray, The Law of Rescue, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 619, 631 (2020) 
(discussing the implications of viewing the duty to rescue as based on rights 
associated with shared citizenship). 
 59. Benzmiller, supra note 18, at 949. 
 60. See Sungyong Kang, In Defense of the “Duty to Report” Crimes, 86 
UMKC L. REV. 361, 368 (2017) (arguing that such non-compliance does lead to 
harm). But cf. Eric Mack, Bad Samaritanism and the Causation of Harm, 9 
PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 230, 241–59 (1980) (critiquing the argument that “the Bad 
Samaritan’s inaction causes the harm which his action would have 
prevented”); Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 
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assumption is that criminal law’s deterrence and stigma will 
regulate the behavior of those who otherwise would not have 
aided, and will potentially achieve other goals of criminal law 
like retribution for the wrongdoer.61 Deontological justifications 
for bad Samaritan laws might rely on the proclaimed malum in 
se nature of the conduct, i.e., that simply not reporting a perilous 
situation, and perhaps most importantly a crime (or in some 
instances not aiding those in peril), is morally wrong behavior 
and thus should be criminalized.62 Corrective justice arguments 
might rely, inter alia, on the notion that the law should condemn 
and punish immoral conduct.63 While highly debatable, 
economic analysis of imposing such affirmative duties could also 
support bad Samaritan laws on efficiency grounds.64 
On the other hand, there is much controversy regarding 
this form of liberty-limiting principle. Libertarians might argue 
that bad Samaritan laws excessively restrict individuals’ 
 
151, 190–95 (1973) (arguing that bad Samaritan laws assign liability where 
causation—a crucial condition for liability—is missing).  
 61. See Kang, supra note 60, at 367 (“[A] duty to report crime leads to 
increased detection of wrongdoings, thus achieving retribution-rehabilitation 
along with general and specific deterrence of crime.”); see also Joshua Dressler, 
Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About “Bad Samaritan” Laws, 40 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971, 980–81 (2000) (suggesting two types of retributivist 
views on bad Samaritan laws: culpability-retributivists—who would rely on 
moral culpability, and harm-retributivists—who would rely on punishing 
those that cause social harm). 
 62. See Kang, supra note 60, at 365–70 (describing the moral aspects of 
Samaritan laws). 
 63. See Hyman, supra note 55, at 655 (“Corrective justice scholars will 
argue that the law should enforce common moral intuitions.”). 
 64. While Landes and Posner generally argued that a duty to rescue could 
be inefficient, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, 
Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and 
Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 85–88 (1978) (modeling the duty to rescue and 
concluding that it generates economic inefficiency), others have disagreed or 
argued that this statement depends on various factors that must be 
considered. See Richard L. Hasen, The Efficient Duty to Rescue, 15 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 141, 142 (1995) (challenging the assumption of Landes’ and 
Posner’s model that the populations of rescuers and victims are entirely 
separate); Bhargava Ray, supra note 58, at 631 (summarizing the controverted 
scholarly points of view on this topic). 
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liberty, individualism, and autonomy.65 They might further 
suggest that such forced altruism is inherently wrong—even 
when reporting or rescuing is rather easily performed and even 
if rendering aid will not place the Samaritan in danger or 
peril66—thus they have a right to refrain from reporting or 
rescuing.67 A consequentialist view might suggest that imposing 
affirmative duties to report or rescue could be harmful to 
society, as it will render rescuers reluctant or reduce the quality 
of potential rescues.68 Some argue that these duties could 
infringe on the victim’s privacy rights, which could be crucial in 
many instances, like that of sexual offenses.69 Other arguments 
rely on the feasibility of identifying the bystanders70 and the 
enforceability of these laws.71 
Pragmatically, even when such a duty is imposed, many 
people will not obey the law for various reasons, e.g., not being 
 
 65. See Swan, supra note 34, at 999 (arguing that the resilience in 
American law of the no duty to rescue norm is connected to “principles of 
autonomy, individualism, and privacy”). 
 66. See Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 139 (noting courts’ refusal 
to abandon the common law no duty to rescue rule, even in cases of easy 
rescue, and summarizing competing views in the literature). 
 67. See Levy, supra note 40, at 657 (explaining the libertarian objection 
to bad Samaritan laws by way of abstract syllogism); Liam Murphy, 
Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue, 89 GEO. L.J. 605, 
632 (2001) (arguing that the American legal tradition is distinctly libertarian); 
Bhargava Ray, supra note 58, at 630 (“Where an individual creates or 
contributes to harm, that individual has some obligation to cure that harm; 
otherwise, the individual has no obligation. Thus, the law should not punish 
the mere failure to act, even if such a rule seems heartless or immoral.”). 
 68. See Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to 
Reasonably Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1447, 1466–76 
(2008) (discussing potential pitfalls of a coercive rule); Bhargava Ray, supra 
note 58, at 630 (“On [the consequentialist] view, imposing a duty to rescue will 
likely backfire and reduce the total incidence of rescue, as ‘reluctant rescuers’ 
will eschew risky activities in order to avoid potential liability.”). 
 69. See Benzmiller, supra note 18, at 947 (“A duty to report a crime may 
unacceptably violate the victim’s privacy, especially for victims of sexual 
offenses.”). 
 70. See Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 139 (“Questions arise 
about the feasibility of identifying the individuals who fail to aid.”). 
 71. See id. at 147 (questioning the effectiveness of duty to report statutes, 
noting that some prosecutors oppose them, and suggesting potentially more 
effective methods of encouraging reporting that don’t rely on criminal 
punishment for failure to do so). 
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aware of it, fear of retaliation, low probability of being identified 
and prosecuted for such lack of aid, fear of legal ramifications or 
from interacting with law enforcement agents, and that aiding 
undermines other competitive norms.72 Some argue that legal 
duties in this context are effectively limited to begin with, as 
they might lead to uncertainty about when and how to act,73 and 
their impact on the willingness to help is low at best.74 Others 
will vote against bad Samaritan laws, as it is potentially 
unconstitutional to criminalize nonfeasance,75 and infringes 
upon the First Amendment as compelled speech, along with also 
potentially violating Fifth Amendment rights against 
self-incrimination.76 As a final example of bad Samaritan 
controversy,77 others argue that while it might be important to 
 
 72. See Eugene Volokh, Duties to Rescue and the Anticooperative Effects 
of Law, 88 GEO. L.J. 105, 106 (1999) (stating the limited influence duty to 
rescue laws have on different types of Samaritans); see also Swan, supra note 
34, at 1006–07, 1026–28 (citing Sharita Forrest, Study Examines Role of 
School Culture in Promoting Bullying, Bystander Intervention, ILL. NEWS 
BUREAU (Aug. 11, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/VYJ5-YVP2 (discussing 
how school culture creates environments that promote or discourage 
bystander intervention)). 
 73. See Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 139 (“A duty to aid others 
may also lead to an uncertainty about when to act and create problems of 
strangers intervening in the affairs of others.”). 
 74. See Hyman, supra note 55, at 688 (“Stated bluntly, the available data 
provides no indication that imposing a duty to rescue has any effect 
whatsoever on the impetus to perform a non-risky rescue.”); Volokh, supra 
note 72, at 106 (stating that the law’s coercive force will be low because 
witnesses know they are unlikely to be identified if they just stay quiet). 
 75. For a full taxonomy on the constitutionality of criminalizing 
nonfeasance, see Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 136–55.  
 76. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, V. The First Amendment was interpreted 
to also include the protection on refraining from speaking, i.e., that the 
government is restricted from compelling speech. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, 
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (stating that an 
important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses 
to speak can also decide “what not to say”); Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 
19, at 148 (“The fact that a person witnesses a violent act by chance, should 
not be the basis for violating protected rights.”). 
 77. Imposing affirmative duties could lead to harmful consequences like 
harm to victims due to the harms or risks to rescuers and these duties might 
“generate only a small number of additional rescue efforts” due to the discount 
in the significance of a purely altruistic act. See Swan, supra note 34, at 999 
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find proper ways to regulate human conduct in such a manner 
that will make members of society more willing to help others, 
it is not the task of the criminal law to do so.78 
 
(stating that individualism holds a privileged position in American society and 
as a result the legal norm of no duty to rescue remains supreme in the vast 
majority of states); Scordato, supra note 68, at 1464–69 (discussing how the 
practical benefits of an affirmative duty of reasonable rescue in tort law would 
be limited because noncompliers would be unlikely to change their behavior).  
 78. The question of when criminal law should extend to a specific conduct 
is complex and has been lengthily debated in academic literature for over 150 
years. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 8–9 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 
1974) (1859) (explaining liberty had a long lineage before Mill). Some theories 
have focused on the notion of potential or actual harm to individuals and to 
society, while other focused on the wrongful nature of the conduct. See id. at 
8. John Mill is famously known for suggesting that the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. See id. at 8–9. As for Samaritan 
laws, one might argue that they are generally designed to aid in preventing, 
or at least reducing, harm to others, thus they could be held as fulfilling Mill’s 
harm principle’s requirements. See id.; Benzmiller, supra note 18, at 949. 
Others, however, argued that if the individual did not cause the actual harm, 
it might not fulfill Mill’s requirements. See, e.g., Robert Justin Lipkin, 
Comment, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An Individualistic 
Justification of the General Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REV. 252, 257 (1983); 
Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 139. Joel Feinberg has further 
developed Mill’s harm principle, suggesting, inter alia, that a failure to 
perform a low-risk rescue is harmful for the victim, thus might fulfill the harm 
principle requirements. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 136–39 (1984); 
Bhargava Ray, supra note 58, at 14. By now, the harm principle is often 
considered as merely one element to consider when criminalizing conduct. See 
FEINBERG supra, at 137–38 (providing a diagram that introduces other 
possible effects on one person’s conduct on another person’s interests). The 
principle was further developed by many scholars over time, and perhaps 
mostly by Feinberg, arguing that “[i]t is always a good reason in support of 
penal legislation that it would be effective in preventing (eliminating, 
reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the one prohibited from 
acting) and there is no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost 
to other values.” JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING xix (1988) (emphasis 
in original). Other approaches to criminalization, like that of legal moralism, 
would advocate for the criminalization of a morally wrongful conduct, 
perpetrated with a culpable state of mind due to its wrongfulness. See ANTONY 
DUFF ET AL., TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 17 (2007). 
Here, one might argue that even without fulfilling the harm principle, not 
aiding those in grave danger, while they could easily and harmlessly do so, is 
an immoral behavior, thus it might be criminalized on these grounds. See 
Bhargava Ray, supra note 58, at 15. Another approach emphasizes the 
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Whether policymakers should enact bad Samaritan laws, or 
even more broadly categorized, affirmative altruistic duties, has 
been lengthily scrutinized and debated in academic literature.79 
Notably, there are both considerable benefits and drawbacks 
that policymakers must take into consideration before imposing 
any affirmative duties on individuals to partake in law 
enforcement, even when such participation is minimal and easy, 
at best, and does not carry actual risks or inflicts harm on the 
reporter.80 
 
protection of social values, suggests that criminalizing behavior should mostly 
rely on identifying an important protected social interest, which could justify 
the reason why a particular conduct should be prohibited by criminal law. See, 
e.g., Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khalid Ghanayim, Proportionality and the 
Aggressor’s Culpability in Self-Defense, 39 TULSA L. REV. 875, 879 (2003). In 
recent years, structured principled approaches to criminalization were 
suggested by few scholars, including myself. Examining bad Samaritan laws 
under these approaches, however, extends beyond the purposes of this Article. 
For two principled approaches to criminalization, see JONATHAN SCHONSHECK, 
ON CRIMINALIZATION (Alan Mabe et al. eds., 1994), and DOUGLAS HUSAK, 
OVERCRIMINALIZATION (2008). Jonathan Schonsheck suggests three elements 
to limit the state’s power to enact criminal legislation: the principle filter, the 
presumptions filter, and the pragmatics filter. See SCHONSHECK, supra, at 25. 
Douglas Husak suggests a structured approach to criminalization, relying on 
internal and external constraints. See HUSAK, supra, at 145. For a full 
taxonomy of criminalization theories, see ELDAR HABER, CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT 
217–56 (2018). 
 79. Academic debate on Samaritan laws is mostly divided between those 
who view a duty to rescue or report as a moral duty and those who view it as 
an act of charity. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, The “Bad Samaritan” Paradigm, 
70 NW. U. L. REV. 798, 798 (1976) (stating that this area of law is unsettling 
because of the disparity between rule of law and morality); Weinrib, supra 
note 14, at 267 (stating although there may be a duty to give charity, the 
omission of any action cannot be considered a legal wrong); Yeager, supra note 
25, at 4 (discussing how scholars viewed the duty to rescue as a duty, not 
charity); Heyman, supra note 58, at 680 (stating that a duty to rescue is “an 
obligation not only owed to the community itself but also to other members of 
that community”); Bhargava Ray, supra note 58, at 630–32 (discussing the 
conflict between freedom of choice and whether or not an individual has a 
moral obligation to act). For an economic analysis of altruism in the context of 
Samaritan duties, see Landes & Posner, supra note 64. 
 80. See Volokh, supra note 72, at 113 (explaining enforceable law 
enforcement policies that may lead to more reporting, including declining to 
prosecute sex workers or undocumented persons who report crimes against 
them).  
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But while this debate has been ongoing for several decades, 
much has changed in recent years in the ways that bystanders 
might witness perilous situations, and more closely, criminal 
activities.81 The developments of digital technology and the 
markets that drive them have led to a potential new form of 
digital bystanders.82 To understand these new forms of 
bystanders and their potential challenges within the context of 
bad Samaritans, the following Part will be further divided into 
two sperate discussions: Part III.A on communications of 
perilous situations and those that witness them online and Part 
III.B on platforms that could detect perilous situations, and 
more specifically criminal activity, using AI technology. 
III.  Online and Artificial Bystanders 
Digital technology has created actual and potential new 
forms of bystanders, which include both human and machines.83 
Within the human perspective, digital technology now enables 
subjecting individuals to becoming online bystanders—users 
who witness perilous situations in real time, like disasters or 
crimes being committed, or digitally contacted by those in peril 
or danger.84 With some notable differences, further explored 
below in Part III.A, this rather new form of online bystanders 
could be somewhat analogized to physical bystanders of perilous 
situations—those who initially triggered bad Samaritan 
legislation.  
Similarly, other technological developments might also 
form a new category of bystanders—platforms or devices that 
are able to detect, to some level of certainty, that an individual 
is currently at risk or that a felony is being committed.85 These 
“artificial bystanders” are essentially AI-based devices and 
services that could surround individuals almost anywhere they 
 
 81. See infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.  
 82. See infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text .  
 83. See Benzmiller, supra note 18, at 934 (stating that the internet and 
other forms of electronic communications have created infinite bystanders). 
 84. See id. at 935 (“The use of electronic communication decreases the 
sender’s awareness of how the receivers will perceive and react to the 
communications.”).  
 85. See infra notes 230–236 and accompanying text.  
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go while they constantly receive and transmit data to a third 
party.86 
This Part introduces the present and (near) future of bad 
Samaritan duties while examining their potential social and 
legal implications. While the current regulatory regime was not 
designed to apply on remote digital bystanders, it is crucial to 
understand how current and future technologies, along with 
social and market forces, might reshape the ways in which 
society and policymakers react to these new forms of 
bystanderism.87 As the main form of bad Samaritan law 
applicable to digital bystanderism is that of the duty to report,88 
simply because duty to rescue generally requires physical 
presence, this Part will focus on the duty to report within the 
context of two separate (but sometimes linked) discussions, 
representing current and future dilemmas: online users (online 
bystanders) and AI-based platforms (artificial bystanders). 
A.  Online Bystanderism 
The internet clearly had a vast impact on how humans gain 
knowledge and communicate with each other. By now, many 
individuals in modern society are often using online services as 
an integral part of their lives—perhaps even as the main form 
of communication with others.89 As such, online services might 
expose individuals to perilous situations, often violent or 
otherwise harmful in nature, that have occurred or are 
 
 86. See infra notes 230–236 and accompanying text.  
 87. See infra notes 109–112 and accompanying text. 
 88. As will be further showed, a duty to rescue is highly limited within 
the digital realm, only applicable to what will be referred to as the “primary 
live streamer”—those individuals that, apart from livestreaming the crime, 
could also potentially rescue the victim. See Benzmiller, supra note 18, at 954 
(“[T]here is little a bystander can do to ‘rescue’ the victim of a harassing 
communication.”). 
 89. Notably, in what often is termed the digital divide, there is gap 
between individuals in terms of access and use of communication technology, 
thus many individuals in society might not even use social media. For more on 
the digital divide, see Chris Ashworth, Bridging the Digital Divide: How to 
Stop Technology Leaving Young People Behind, GUARDIAN (July 24, 2017, 2:19 
PM), https://perma.cc/MA7C-9K9X. 
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currently occurring somewhere around the world.90 These 
internet users might, for instance, be contacted directly by 
someone for aid or contacted indirectly, as spectators witnessing 
individuals in distress or in a perilous situation via, e.g., a 
livestream of an ongoing crime, a car accident, or other common 
disasters.91 In other words, the internet, perhaps mostly led by 
social media platforms, has opened a gateway of transforming 
individuals into a new form of bystanders—those without their 
physical presence where perilous situations take place.92 
 Perhaps not surprisingly, we have come to witness in 
recent years individuals who used social media platforms to 
livestream criminal activities such as rape,93 assault,94 abuse,95 
 
 90. See infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 91. See infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 92. See Benzmiller, supra note 18, at 934 (“The Internet and other forms 
of electronic communication also foster harmful social behavior because such 
technology alters the nature of social interactions.”).  
 93. See Mike McPhate, Teenager Is Accused of Livestreaming a Friend’s 
Rape on Periscope, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/2QJD-DL2L 
(stating that Marina Lonina was accused of livestreaming her 17-year-old 
friend being raped on the Periscope app); Yaron Steinbuch, Suspects in 
Livestreamed Gang Rape Are Afghan Immigrants, N.Y. POST (Jan. 26, 2017, 
12:51 PM), https://perma.cc/HRX8-HQVG (describing how a three-hour rape 
of a woman was livestreamed on Facebook). 
 94. See J. Weston Phippen, The Desire to Livestream Violence, ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/BD6X-3623 (describing the livestream of the 
kidnapping and torturing of a man, in which the attackers were using a knife 
to slice off a piece of the victim’s hair, down to his scalp, all while other online 
participants were watching and commenting). 
 95. See Alan Yuhas, Ohio Mother who Taped Son to Wall on Facebook 
Live Faces Charges, GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2019, 9:04 AM), 
https://perma.cc/6P49-AFDK (describing how a woman from Ohio was using 
Facebook Live to broadcast how she taped her two-year-old son to a wall). 
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hate crimes,96 murder,97 and even mass massacres,98 to name 
but a handful of examples. These so-called “livestreaming 
crimes” largely formed the abovementioned “online bystanders”: 
individuals who, much like witnessing a crime or other perilous 
situations in the physical world, now do so digitally from afar.99 
These users might either remain passive, in the sense that they 
only watch the livestream, or they might become more active, 
e.g., comment on the stream, share it with others, or contact 
someone for the aid of those in peril.100 
 Naturally, these livestreaming crimes raise a host of legal 
questions, mainly within the context of intellectual property,101 
 
 96. See Sam Levin & Amber Jamieson, Four Suspects Charged with Hate 
Crimes over Beating in Facebook Live Video, GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2017, 2:22 PM), 
https://perma.cc/9AVY-G65S (explaining how four individuals were charged 
with hate crimes after they livestreamed gagging and brutally attacking a 
person with disability); Adi Robertson, An Anti-Semitic Shooting in Germany 
Was Livestreamed on Twitch, VERGE (Oct. 9, 2019, 1:34 PM), 
https://perma.cc/RJP3-TL6M (describing a terror attack outside a synagogue 
in Germany was livestreamed on Twitch); Dave Maclean, Two Killed in 
Shooting During a Livestreamed Church Service in Texas, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 
29, 2019, 8:14 PM), https://perma.cc/D992-6Z93 (describing a man who opened 
fire during a livestreamed church service in Fort Worth, Texas, while killing 
another individual aside from himself). 
 97. See Patpicha Tanakasempipat & Panarat Thepgumpanat, Thai Man 
Broadcasts Baby Daughter’s Murder Live on Facebook, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 
2017, 7:47 AM), https://perma.cc/928B-G2SD (reporting that a man filmed 
himself on Facebook killing his eleven-month-old daughter, and eventually 
committed suicide). 
 98. See Kevin Roose, A Mass Murder of, and for, the Internet, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/H9D4-ML9F (describing a live video stream 
of mass shooting in Christchurch, New Zealand, where fifty-one people were 
killed and forty-eight were injured during an attack on two mosques). 
 99. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.  
 100. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 101. Copyright law generally grants protection for works that are both 
original and fixed in a tangible medium of expression, regardless of content. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this 
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device . . . .”). In other words, these livestreaming crimes might 
enjoy copyright protection, but such protection might be undesirable for 
society for various reasons. For more on the copyright aspects of livestreaming 
crimes, see generally Eldar Haber, Copyrighted Crimes: The Copyrightability 
of Illegal Works, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH 454 (2014). 
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and privacy rights.102 In the context of Samaritan laws, 
livestreaming crimes raises crucial questions as to the legal 
duty of individuals in society to assist those in distress or in 
perilous situations by reporting it, much like the legal 
obligations that many states have imposed on individuals 
physically present at these events. In other words, the 
normative question that unfolds here is whether the current 
Samaritan duties could or should be imposed on online 
bystanders, i.e., does the law currently hold these users 
accountable for being bad Samaritans, and even if not, should 
reporting perilous situations online, and more specifically, 
livestreaming crimes, remain a moral choice or become a legal 
duty? 
To answer this complex question, the next Part 
differentiates between two forms of online bystanders: 
communicators and viewers.103 Online communicators are those 
who are either the primary livestreaming users—those 
communicating the perilous situation to other individuals 
online and physically present at the scene—or secondary users, 
likely not physically present at the scene but who further 
communicate (or share) the event to other users, hence 
potentially making it more visible.104 In contrast, online viewers 
 
 102. One issue, beyond the scope of this Article, is that of the right to 
privacy in public places. For more on privacy in public places in the context of 
livestreaming, see generally Daxton R. “Chip” Stewart & Jeremy Littau, Up, 
Periscope: Mobile Streaming Video Technologies, Privacy in Public, and the 
Right to Record, 93 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 312 (2016). For other legal 
concerns, see Kerry O’Shea Gorgone, Live Streaming Video: Is It Legal?, 
HUFFPOST (Aug. 30, 2017, 11:36 AM), https://perma.cc/5FAF-64CM; Sara 
Hawkins, Legal Ins and Outs of Live Streaming in Public, SARA F. HAWKINS 
(Oct. 5, 2015), https://perma.cc/8YTD-Y3Y6.  
 103. See infra Part III.B.  
 104. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. Notably, and as will 
be further discussed, this act might also raise awareness, and some social 
media platform will often remove this content when they become aware of it. 
Facebook, for instance, claims that it removes content that expresses support 
or praise for organizations or individuals involved in “terrorist activity, 
organized hate, mass murder (including attempts) or multiple murder, human 
trafficking, and organized violence or criminal activity.” See Community 
Standards, FACEBOOK (2020), https://perma.cc/L9ZD-AHUG.  
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are passive.105 They watch the communication without further 
communicating or distributing it to others.106 
1.  Online Communicators 
Depending on the jurisdiction, it is rather evident that the 
primary livestreaming user of perilous situations might face 
liability in the context of bad Samaritan laws. The reason is 
self-evident: if these individuals either have a duty to report (or 
to rescue) under the state Samaritan law where the event took 
place, and they are physically present there, they are obliged to 
meet the legal requirements much like any other bystander.107 
The more relevant question in this context is whether 
communicating the perilous situation could be considered 
reporting the event, thus satisfying the requirement to actively 
report the perilous situation.108 
To contextualize this argument, consider the current legal 
requirements of selected bad Samaritan laws. Minnesota’s and 
Hawaii’s bad Samaritan laws require giving victims “reasonable 
assistance,” which “may include obtaining or attempting to 
obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel.”109 
Vermont requires one to give “reasonable assistance or care” but 
only if such assistance or care is not being provided by others.110 
 
 105. See Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price to Play: Are Passive Online 
Media Users Bound by Terms of Use, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 411 (2010) 
(defining “passive online media user” as any reader, viewer, listener who 
makes use of a website for informational, research or entertainment purposes 
only, without contributing content or otherwise interacting). 
 106. See id.  
 107. See infra notes 109–112 and accompanying text.  
 108. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.  
 109. See MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2020) (“A person at the scene of an 
emergency who knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave 
physical harm shall, to the extent that the person can do so without danger or 
peril to self or others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person.”); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 663-1.6 (2019) (“Any person at the scene of a crime who knows 
that a victim of the crime is suffering from serious physical harm shall obtain 
or attempt to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel if the 
person can do so without danger or peril to any person.”).  
 110. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2019)  
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Wisconsin’s law applies solely to criminal conduct and obliges 
one to “summon law enforcement officers or other assistance or 
shall provide assistance to the victim.”111 As a final example, 
Rhode Island simply states that one must give reasonable 
assistance to victims, without providing further guidance on the 
interpretation of the statute.112 
 Does the act of communication, by itself, currently fall 
under the legal requirements of assistance or reporting, thus 
granting live-streamers immunity for not physically aiding 
those in peril? Naturally, it is difficult to assess whether 
streaming the perilous situation—thereby communicating the 
event to others seeking their aid in contacting law enforcement 
agencies—would fall into the various vague requirements set by 
these different statutes. One might consider that untangling the 
conundrum of whether to interpret the action of livestreaming 
as assistance will depend greatly on the emphasis one places on 
the cause or the effect of such communication.113 The cause 
behind the livestream relates to the mental element behind the 
communicator’s intention, his mens rea.114 On the other hand, 
the effect of the communication disregards mental state, 
focusing only on whether the livestream directly led to 
assistance.115  
 
A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm 
shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger 
or peril to himself or herself or without interference with important 
duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed 
person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others. 
 111. See WIS. STAT. § 940.34(2)(a) (2020) (“Any person who knows that a 
crime is being committed and that a victim is exposed to bodily harm shall 
summon law enforcement officers or other assistance or shall provide 
assistance to the victim.”).  
 112. See 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-56-1 (2020)  
Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another 
person is exposed to, or has suffered, grave physical harm shall, to 
the extent that he or she can do so without danger or peril to himself 
or herself or to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed 
person.  
 113. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.  
 115. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
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Those who acknowledge the dominant rationale behind bad 
Samaritan laws, that is, to morally educate members of society, 
will vote for placing the emphasis on the cause of livestreaming 
crimes.116 Those who place importance on the effects side of this 
debate, might be more pragmatic and reach an opposite 
conclusion—that the mental state is irrelevant, as long as those 
in perilous situations benefit from assistance prompted by the 
livestream.117 
This debate is linked also to the second type of online 
communicators—secondary users—those not physically present 
at the perilous situation but who communicate the event to 
other users online, hence making it more visible.118 Unlike the 
primary livestreamer, secondary users are in no physical 
position to rescue the victim but are potentially able to aid them 
by reporting the incident.119 As Part III.A.2 further discusses 
the passive aspect of online communicators, this Part focuses on 
their active conduct, i.e., whether users who have shared, 
commented, liked, or made the livestream otherwise more 
visible to others, could and should bear legal liability for their 
actions. But as discussion on the active role that secondary 
users play is generally akin to the general benefits and 
drawbacks of the primary livestreamer (aside from not being 
able to grant physical assistance) and the interpretation of 
current bad Samaritan statutes that require some form of 
reasonable assistance by bystanders, they will be jointly 
analyzed. 
Currently, courts will not likely interpret livestreaming as 
assistance under present bad Samaritan legislation, as it was 
born out of the cause rational, i.e., the mental state of the 
 
 116. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Jillian C. York, The Murky Ethics of Facebook Live and Filming 
People Without Their Consent, QUARTZ (Apr. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/PC4E-
89GA (noting that in the United States photojournalists “often live by the 
mantra of asking forgiveness, rather than permission” to film perilous 
situations).  
 118. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 148 (explaining that a duty 
to report crimes would allow law enforcement to respond to crimes quickly and 
prevent leads from becoming stale). But see Benzmiller, supra note 18, at 947 
(“A duty to report a crime may unacceptably violate the victim’s privacy, 
especially for victims of sexual offenses.”). 
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Samaritan which sparked a public outcry.120 Still, a growth in 
the practice of livestreaming crimes or other perilous 
situations121—along with evidence that these livestreams might 
be proven highly beneficial for those in peril—can change the 
reasoning behind new bad Samaritan laws, thereby extending 
legal immunity to online communications. In other words, even 
if current interpretation of bad Samaritan laws will lead to 
holding online communicators legally liable, the normative 
question is whether the law should include livestreams as 
“assistance” or reporting. 
To answer this question, one must first evaluate whether 
livestreaming of perilous situations, and perhaps mostly 
livestreaming crimes, is a socially desirable conduct that should 
be promoted by the law or by any other means. On its merits, 
one might argue that livestreaming crimes or other perilous 
situations is a socially preferable conduct as these livestreams 
could, inter alia, aid those in peril by drawing attention to the 
event in real time, thus increasing the plausibility that 
someone, including law enforcement agents, will come to their 
aid.122 Communicating perilous situations might also aid 
individuals close to the event to be wary of it, thus raising 
awareness of risks in general, allowing them to avoid the 
area,123 or even moving them to assist those in peril.124  
 
 120. For a discussion on present bad Samaritan legislation, see supra 
notes 109–112 and accompanying text. 
 121. See David Glance, As Live Streaming Murder Becomes the New 
Normal Online, Can Social Media Be Saved?, PHYS.ORG, (Apr. 19, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/UL8M-F63S (explaining that livestreaming of murders and 
suicides have become increasingly frequent occurrences). 
 122. See Tracy Moore, The Benefits—and Drawbacks—of Livestreaming 
Crime, VOCATIVE (Apr. 21, 2016, 1:40 PM), https://perma.cc/5H8P-GJUJ 
(stating that a livestreamer’s attorney argued that she was streaming the 
assault in order to gather evidence). 
 123. Vigilante, later rebranded as “Citizen”, is an example of a “[l]ive 
crime alert app” which “sends users a push notification of crimes in progress 
so they can either choose to avoid the area or go to the scene to broadcast live 
video as the crime takes place.” Khari Johnson, Apple Removes Vigilante Live 
Crime Alert Tool from the App Store, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 1, 2016, 8:18 AM), 
https://perma.cc/3NH8-NVRV.  
 124. See Olivia Solon, Crime-Reporting App Vigilante Kicked Off App Store 
over Apple’s Content Concerns, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2016, 7:05 PM), 
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The livestreaming of crimes specifically could aid in the 
fight against crimes and injustice, and perhaps even aid in 
strengthening the connection and trust within the 
community.125 Potentially, in this context, livestreaming crimes 
could even strengthen the community-police relationship, as 
long as the latter will have sufficient digital presence and 
responsiveness so that the former could easily alert them.126 It 
thus potentially creates a new public safety resource, prompted 
by the online environment.127 
Streaming and capturing perilous situations also possess 
social and legal benefits beyond the immediate aid to those in 
peril, especially when it comes to criminal conduct.128 They could 
potentially aid law enforcement agencies and victims in 
obtaining evidence and are thus important. This is especially 
true when leads to the suspect of the crime are considered 
“hot,”129 or the leads provide assistance to victims (and the state) 
in future related legal proceedings.130 Streaming and capturing 
thus hold significance for society as a whole and the victim 
 
https://perma.cc/ZQ9U-6PML (indicating that that the app was designed to 
empower people and restore faith in law enforcement). 
 125. See id. (“[T]ransparency is the single most powerful tool against crime 
and injustice.”). Livestreaming could, for instance, aid in documenting and 
reducing police brutality. See id. (“On one hand Vigilante talks about restoring 
trust between law enforcement and the community, which suggests that video 
streaming could help document and prevent police brutality.”). 
 126. See SOCIAL MEDIA STRATEGY IN POLICING 93–94 (Babak Akghar et al., 
eds., 2019) (“What becomes noticeable through researching these nuanced 
methods is law enforcement’s solicitation of remoulding the bystander effect 
by innovative technological means encouraging the transition of the public 
from passive spectators of crime to active witnesses, recognising their 
potential in aiding investigations.”).  
 127. See id. at 94 (“These examples express an intriguing development in 
understanding public crime reporting as a phenomenon that provides 
opportunities for law enforcement.”).  
 128. See id. (“They further display growing law enforcement efforts to 
capitalise on changing crime reporting behaviours to benefit intelligence 
gathering and investigations.”).  
 129. See Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 148 (“By compelling 
witnesses to report crimes as soon as reasonably possible, authorities will be 
able to investigate leads while they are still ‘hot.’”). 
 130. See SOCIAL MEDIA STRATEGY IN POLICING, supra note 126, at 93 
(discussing how data provided by public crime reporting on social media can 
be used by law enforcement agencies to aid in investigations). 
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specifically, in both criminal and civil cases.131 One might argue 
that as collecting evidence should be generally encouraged,132 
they should be promoted at least in those situations where the 
communicator was clearly unable to reasonably and without 
self-risk or harm stop the crime and notify law enforcement 
agencies prior or during the livestream.133 This benefit broadens 
the potential benefits of kinetic bystanderism beyond the 
classical rationales of bad Samaritan laws, as the potential 
evidence gathered will most likely prove more efficient than 
eye-witnessed crimes in the physical realm.134 
The negative aspects of the livestreaming of perilous 
situations, especially livestreaming crimes, are 
non-negligible.135 For one, it would be highly difficult to evaluate 
what better serves society: attempting to aid those in peril 
personally while directly notifying law enforcement agencies or 
communicating the event for purposes of both potential aid and 
evidence. One must also bear in mind that there are several 
other negative consequences of such communications that must 
 
 131. These videos could eventually provide evidence to be used when 
prosecuting a culprit, but also, to clear suspects. See Ryan Tarinelli, Bystander 
Uses Facebook Live to Show Little Rock Shooting Scene; Live Streams New 
Trend, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Mar. 20, 2017, 4:30 AM), 
https://perma.cc/Z9YL-FJMB (“Recording the scene can provide evidence that 
can be used to prosecute a culprit, he said, and can also be used to clear a 
defendant of any wrongdoing.”).  
 132. See Moore, supra note 122 (“If you were witnessing a crime and 
unable to stop it by yourself, taking or collecting evidence or livestreaming 
with hopes that someone would see it and stop it would be something we’d 
want to encourage, and as a general matter, would be protected.”). 
 133. See supra notes 126–128 and accompanying text; see also Moore, 
supra note 122 (“Now, if facts were to show it were done as part of a broader 
criminal act—if she were participating in a conspiracy or engaged in 
nonconsensual videotaping of someone who was currently the victim of a 
crime, then that act could be criminalized. Intent matters a lot.” (internal 
quotation omitted)). 
 134. See Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 148 (“[Use of livestreaming 
evidence] would conceivably lead to more arrests and convictions of violent 
felons.”).  
 135. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 122 (indicating that livestreaming crime 
raises privacy concerns for victims of crime and may lead bystanders to record 
an incident rather than render assistance).  
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be taken into account.136 These include the privacy rights of the 
those in peril, even if at public places;137 the emotional and 
psychological effects of such online exposure;138 the effect of the 
violent or otherwise harmful nature of many livestreams on 
some viewers;139 the inclusion of innocent people nearby;140 the 
possibility that the livestream might be false or blown out of 
proportion and cause unnecessary panic due to the availability 
heuristic;141 the risk that attention of users might provide tacit 
support for an immoral conduct;142  the risk that it could 
perpetuate biases and racial profiling in the sense that the 
community will use discretion on which events they choose to 
 
 136. See Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of Criminology on Criminal 
Law: Evaluating Arrests for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 14 (1993) (explaining that police intervention does not always 
diffuse violent situations and are often less successful in domestic violence 
cases, with the violence escalating in retaliation for the arrest).  
 137. The Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
standard does not generally cover public places. Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is 
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”). In some instances, however, 
courts have held that in places designed to ensure privacy, like a telephone 
booth or public restrooms, the Fourth Amendment protection might apply. See 
id. at 352; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For more on these cases and on privacy in 
public places, see generally Helen Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to 
Privacy in Public: Challenges of Information Technology, 7 ETHICS & BEHAV. 
207 (1997); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141 
(2014); supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 138. See generally Anthony Feinstein et al., Witnessing Images of Extreme 
Violence: A Psychological Study of Journalists in the Newsroom, 6 J. ROYAL 
SOC’Y MED. 1 (2014). 
 139. See generally id. 
 140. See Jillian C. York, The Murky Ethics of Facebook Live and Filming 
People Without Their Consent, QUARTZ (Apr. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/PC4E-
89GA (discussing the potential risk of retaliation when individuals record 
other unassuming individuals without asking permission).  
 141. The availability heuristic suggests that individuals make mental 
shortcuts and heavily weigh their judgments (i.e., the plausibility of these 
events to reoccur) toward more recent information. See ANTHONY ESGATE ET 
AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 201–02 (2005). 
 142. See Benzmiller, supra note 18, at 932 (“Bystanders, by their mere 
presence and attention, provide at least tacit support so that the bully does 
not act entirely alone.”).  
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livestream or report;143 among other potential drawbacks.144 In 
the specific context of secondary users, one might argue that 
drawing attention to the livestream might inflict further harm 
on the victim—which is morally distinct from simply not 
aiding.145 
Notably, this discussion extends far beyond bad Samaritan 
laws, as the fundamental question behind it relates to other 
normative and social values.146 The answer to this conundrum 
will depend on whether the act of communication could lead to 
aiding victims or others in perilous situations, balanced against 
the negative impacts of these livestreams on some individuals, 
and on society as a whole. Imposing criminal liability on either 
form of communicators might potentially lead to a reduction in 
livestreams of perilous situations like livestreaming 
crimes— lowering the incentive for at least some online 
communicators to livestream and abstain from aiding those in 
peril otherwise.147 On the other hand, while there are many 
drawbacks to these livestreams, they might still aid those in 
 
 143. See Scott Lucas, The Citizen’s Dilemma, S.F. MAG. (Dec. 20. 2017), 
https://perma.cc/7K7H-Y9GZ (explaining that when individuals hastily report 
on their community members it encourages bias ); Taylor Hatmaker, Citizen 
Expands Its Crime-Tracking Alert App to Baltimore, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 15, 
2019, 7:51 PM), https://perma.cc/E849-7RDW (“[T]here’s no evidence this state 
of hyper-awareness does any quantifiable good, and at least some evidence 
that it can actually put people, specifically people of color, at more risk due to 
implicit bias and racial profiling.”). 
 144. For more on racial biases in the context of bad Samaritan laws, see 
Swan, supra note 34, at 1044–45. 
 145. See Bhargava Ray, supra note 58, at 630 (arguing that the law should 
not punish the mere failure to act, even if such a rule seems heartless or 
immoral because an individual does not violate another individual’s rights 
simply by declining to aid them).  
 146. See generally Joel Feinberg, The Moral and Legal Responsibility of 
the Bad Samaritan, 3 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 56 (1984) (discussing moral values 
and objections to bad Samaritan statutes).  
 147. See Benzmiller, supra note 18, at 961 (“Many people refuse to assist 
victims of crime out of fear of retribution; if reporting is to be a viable 
alternative for these individuals, they must believe that police will respect 
their anonymity.”). 
Haber.PostBlueline.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  4:56 PM 
1590 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1559 (2020) 
 
peril and in obtaining evidence,148 and thus any legal obligation 
in this context must be carefully examined.  
Still, the law might be highly limited in regulating these 
livestreams if policymakers focus on online 
communicators— and more specifically, the primary 
livestreamers. While communicators are the initial cause of this 
potential problem, bad Samaritan laws will not likely serve as a 
deterrent to livestream these events due, inter alia, to the fact 
that many of these livestreaming crimes were communicated by 
those committing the crime.149 The more fundamental and 
applicable question in the context of Samaritan duties is that of 
passive online users who view the livestream but do not actively 
react to it or actively participate in the dissemination of the 
content in any way. 
2.  Online Viewers 
Do current bad Samaritan laws impose a legal duty of 
assistance on passive online viewers? To understand the 
potential legal liability that online viewers might currently face, 
it is crucial to interpret the general duty-to-report 
requirements. But as duties to report crimes and other perilous 
situations vary between states, each potentially leading to 
somewhat of a different interpretation, this Part explores 
potential legal lability through scrutinizing the example of bad 
Samaritans laws in the state of Texas (“Texas example”).  
The Texas Penal Code deems it an offense if the observer of 
a felony “in which a reasonable person would believe that an 
offense had been committed in which serious bodily injury or 
 
 148. See SOCIAL MEDIA STRATEGY IN POLICING, supra note 126, at 94 
(explaining that when social media is a platform where crime reports are 
shared, law enforcement can capitalize on changing crime reporting behaviors 
to benefit intelligence gathering and investigations). 
 149. See Olivia Solon, Why a Rising Number of Criminals Are Using 
Facebook Live to Film Their Acts, GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2017, 5:33 PM), 
https://perma.cc/N7Y4-QY9T (last updated Sept. 20, 2017, 12:08 PM) (stating 
that the practice of documenting one’s crimes is on the rise even though it is 
self-incriminating). This argument further raises an odd, but perhaps rather 
self-evident, question: can those who committed a crime be liable also for not 
aiding their own victim, thereby potentially breaking the bad Samaritan law 
in their jurisdiction? 
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death may have resulted” did not immediately report it to a law 
enforcement agency, and as long as a reasonable person “would 
believe that the commission of the offense had not been 
reported” and as long as the reporting does not place them in 
“danger of suffering serious bodily injury or death.”150 While this 
example will mainly serve to discuss livestreaming crimes, as it 
is confined to felonies, the discussion of non-criminal perilous 
situations that could be applicable under other statutes would 
similarly apply in most instances. 
 The Texas example does not currently differentiate 
between offline and online observers of a felony; thus, it could 
theoretically be applied to online viewers.151 But unlike the 
discussion of online communicators, digital viewership might 
change the interpretation of current (and desirable) bad 
Samaritan duties, regardless of examining whether these 
viewers rendered assistance or not. In other words, the initial 
issue here would be the potential changes in the mental state of 
the viewer which might be different in digital viewing. 
Factually, as mental state is already embedded within the 
criminal system,152 the outcome of such analysis will most likely 
depend on specific events, along with many potential barriers 
that will be further explored. 
 The broader question is thus not whether the law could 
impose affirmative duties on online users to assist those in 
perilous situations, but whether it should. The answer relates, 
inter alia, to the potential differences between offline and online 
observers, i.e., that one must scrutinize if observing a felony 
changes due to the medium through which the felony is 
communicated.153 In other words, the fundamental normative 
question is whether witnessing a felony live online (or more 
generally, perilous situations in some states) is inherently 
different than doing so in the physical world, and whether the 
potential differences between the two conducts should play a 
 
 150. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.171 (West 2020). 
 151. See id. (explaining the Texas bystander statute).  
 152. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932) 
(“No problem of criminal law is of more fundamental importance or has proved 
more baffling through the centuries than the determination of the precise 
mental element or mens rea necessary for crime.”). 
 153. See supra notes 105–108 and accompanying text. 
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role in either interpreting the Samaritan duty to report or 
creating a new one. 
 The normative aspects of imposing bad Samaritan duties 
to report do not generally change in light of technology.154 On 
the contrary, duties to report perilous situations like crimes 
should even be enhanced when online, because unlike in the 
physical world, online bystanders are exposed to no immediate 
risk for aiding those in peril.155 Factually, in many instances 
users who reported these events were directly responsible for 
leading law enforcement agencies to the responsible parties.156 
Under this argument, policymakers must impose even stricter 
duties to report on online bystanders than those imposed in the 
physical world, as these users could potentially aid those in 
distress or perilous situations without the risks associated with 
reporting them when physically present. Under this rationale, 
there is little support for not imposing similar duties simply 
because the medium of viewership changes. 
 The barriers for imposing such affirmative duties are both 
pragmatic and normative in nature. On the pragmatic side, one 
challenge is that of the mental state and cognitive failures of 
online bystanders.157 Unlike witnessing an event in the physical 
world, viewing a livestream of a perilous situation is highly 
subjective to the viewer, in the sense that the communicated 
scene might be perceived as either a prank or something that is 
seemingly blown out of proportion, to name but a few potential 
cognitive interpretations of online viewership.158 These viewers 
might not be able to distinguish between an actual crime being 
 
 154. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
 155. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.171 (indicating that in the Texas 
example the duty to report only attaches as long as the reporting does not 
place the individual in “danger of suffering serious bodily injury or death”).  
 156. See, e.g., Kelly Malone, Live Streaming Crime: How Do We Police the 
Internet?, CBC NEWS (Apr. 5, 2017, 1:10 PM), https://perma.cc/M57C-HTEQ 
(explaining that officers arrested three people after someone watching the 
weekend live stream reported the assault to police). 
 157. See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text.  
 158. See Stuart Wolpert, UCLA Psychology Study Explains When and Why 
Bystanders Intervene in Cyberbullying, UCLA NEWSROOM (Jan. 14, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/YY7Q-SBKX (discussing an online study conducted in which 
participants’ responses to cyberbullying varied based on the level of personal 
expression of the victim’s feeling).  
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committed or something else. They might not be able to tell if 
the event is occurring live and how much the source, which they 
might not be familiar with at all, is in fact reliable. Consider 
again in this context the Texas example, requiring that “a 
reasonable person would believe that an offense had been 
committed.”159 How should the law in Texas interpret such a 
subjective requirement given the aforementioned cognitive 
biases and challenges? 
 Without diminishing the importance of such biases and 
pragmatic aspects, suppose that this challenge is somehow met, 
meaning that viewers comprehend that a crime or another 
perilous situation is being conducted and communicated in real 
time. If bad Samaritan laws were initially drafted as a response 
to the public’s outcry against humans not aiding those in 
need,160 then should it be different where dozens of people 
witness a livestream of, say, a fifteen-year-old girl getting raped 
and do nothing?161 What about livestreaming an ongoing fatal 
car accident or common disaster with hundreds of individuals in 
 
 159. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.171 (West 2020).  
 160. As mentioned, bad Samaritan laws were often triggered by a horrific 
event, by which bystanders chose not to aid or report law enforcement 
agencies. One famous incident occurred in Las Vegas, Nevada, where David 
Cash witnessed the attack of a seven-year-old girl in a restroom by his friend 
Jeremy Strohmeyer and did not aid the girl or report the event. See Jeremy 
Waldron, On the Road: Good Samaritans and Compelling Duties, 40 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1053, 1054 (2000) (recounting the event). The victim, Sherrice 
Iverson, was then sexually molested and strangled to death. Id. After 
knowledge of this event, many have proposed to legislate both state and 
federal bad Samaritan laws. See id. at 1055 (attributing pressure for a Nevada 
Good Samaritan law to the event); Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 135, 
140 (noting that the Nevada incident led to the enactment of bad Samaritan 
laws). The death of Princess Diana sparked public discussion as well, because 
photographers who witnessed the crash did not offer assistance to the victims. 
See id. at 140. Vermont passed its “Good Samaritan Statute” in response to 
the death of a young woman in New York, which occurred while her nearby 
neighbors who witnessed the crime did not report it. Id. 
 161. This event refers to an incident which occurred in March 2017 in 
Chicago. There, a Facebook live stream showed the gang rape of a 
fifteen-year-old girl, and the forty people who watched the livestream did not 
report the crime. See Malone, supra note 156. One response is that regardless 
of the venue—physical or digital—it is generally undesirable to enact laws due 
to specific events. See Givelber, supra note 13, at 3171. 
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need of aid, while users carelessly watch the livestream and do 
nothing? 
Notably, there are a few other important differences 
between physical and online viewership. One main difference is 
that of an “online disinhibition effect,”162 whereby users’ 
inhibitions, often present in the physical world, are somewhat 
loosened online.163 Online viewership could lead to 
desensitization of users, thereby making them less likely to feel 
obligated to report these events.164 One main example of such 
effect is users’ experience of “dissociative 
imagination”— essentially the feeling of escapism that the 
online world could create (i.e., that people often perceive online 
interaction as “less real”)—combined also with dissociative 
anonymity and perceived invisibility, leads them to act 
differently than in the physical world.165 
 
 162. The online disinhibition effect relates to the “loosening of social 
restrictions and inhibitions that are normally present in face-to-face 
interactions.” Online Disinhibition Effect (Suler), LEARNING THEORIES (Dec. 15, 
2015), https://perma.cc/6C2S-UB6E; see generally Laura Martocci, 
Livestreamed Violent Criminal Acts, PSYCH. TODAY (June 9, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/Q68K-N3CG (discussing how online disinhibition applies in 
cases of terrible crimes being streamed). John Suler further divides the effect 
into two categories: benign and toxic disinhibition. See generally John Suler, 
The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 321 (2004) 
(explaining how benign disinhibition might lead a person to be more genuine 
over the internet than in their normal life, whereas toxic disinhibition results 
in negative behaviors that would be avoided in the real world). 
 163. See Martocci, supra note 162 (defining the online disinhibition effect). 
 164. See id. (linking the online disinhibition effect to desensitization 
towards acts of violence).  
 165. See Online Disinhibition Effect (Suler), supra note 162, at 321 
(identifying differences in behaviors online and in the physical world as online 
disinhibition). Online disinhibition is due to several reasons: (1) dissociative 
anonymity, whereby anonymity is translated into people feeling safer and 
protected to act online, and thereby could be more engaging in antisocial or 
otherwise harmful behavior (or less inhibited by social conventions and 
restraints); (2) invisibility that enables lowering inhibitions and allowing 
misrepresentation; (3) asynchronicity, whereby many online actions are not 
occurring in “real time,” enabling users to communicate when they desire; (4) 
solipsistic introjection, whereby users might feel comfortable communicating 
with other users as they assign “imagined characteristics to another person 
based off of their messages and online persona;” (5) dissociative imagination, 
meaning that users might view online communication as some sort of a game 
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In general, viewers might still not feel obligated to aid 
others in peril, whereas the event seems detached from their 
lives, once again due to various cognitive biases, like that of the 
so-called “bystander effect,” as they might assume that someone 
else, perhaps even the platform, will take action;166 and that 
unlike with physical presence, they have limited ways to 
actually aid.167 Notably, however, this bystander effect might 
not be fully translated into the digital era, as there is evidence 
to support the conclusion that people tend to behave kindly 
toward strangers on the internet more so than in real life 
situations.168 
Going back to the Texas example, one must consider 
whether “a reasonable person would believe that the 
commission of the offense had not been reported.”169 Physical 
viewers might be better positioned to make such a judgement, 
as online viewers have little knowledge of other individuals 
present at the event, let alone if other users have reported it 
 
that the physical rules do not apply; and (6) minimization of status and 
authority, in so much as the traditional forms of authority that are often 
translated into dress, body language, name titles, and their environments, do 
not occur online, letting users treat everyone as other users or peers. See id. 
at 321 (listing Suler’s causes for online disinhibition); id. at 322–24 
(articulating the reasons for online disinhibition); see also Darby Dickerson, 
Cyberbullies on Campus, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 51, 62–63 (2005) (describing the 
drawbacks of anonymity in the context of cyberbullying). 
 166. Users might be reluctant to report these crimes due to a bystander 
effect, first discovered and coined by Latané & Darley—whereby the presence 
of other bystanders might reduce the likelihood of bystanders to intervene, 
because people often interpret the situation as less-serious, and due to 
diffusion of responsibility, whereby people conceive that the responsibility for 
action is diffused between them, thus they feel less guilty or responsible for 
aiding. See Bibb Latané & John M. Darley, Bystander “Apathy”, 57 AM. 
SCIENTIST 244, 248–49, 265–66 (1969) (describing the bystander effect); Swan, 
supra note 34, at 984–86 (examining the bystander effect and elaborating on 
diffusion of responsibility). Others, however, questioned the extent to which 
the bystander effect occurs online and argued that diffusion of responsibility 
could work both ways on the internet due, inter alia, to ambiguousness in 
assessing the group size. See WALLACE, supra note 34, at 198. 
 167. See Rossalyn Warren, When Rape is Broadcast Live on the Internet, 
BUZZFEED (Apr. 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/5M46-AKBL (noting that viewers 
of a livestreamed rape, who did not know how to intervene, were frustrated). 
 168. See WALLACE, supra note 34, at 192. 
 169. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.171 (West 2020). 
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prior to them.170 Thus, here too, it would be highly problematic 
to interpret the duty to report requirements to apply online or 
impose it by new legislation. 
 Another challenge relates to the limits of the law to 
regulate such behavior online. These livestreams could often 
occur in remote places, thus raising various legal challenges.171 
One major challenge is jurisdictional in scope: as bad Samaritan 
laws vary greatly between states, and are often even entirely 
absent in some jurisdictions, it would be highly difficult to 
evaluate if the duty should be imposed at all and on whom.172 In 
other words, unlike the physical world, the online bystander 
(i.e., the viewer) might be located in a different legal jurisdiction 
from where the crime takes place.173 In this instance, supposing 
that the law could be interpreted to apply, which bad Samaritan 
law would be invoked? The legal jurisdiction where the perilous 
situation occurs (and communicated from)? Or the legal 
jurisdiction where the viewer of it is currently present? In other 
words, online viewership in the context of bad Samaritan laws 
raises questions of jurisdiction, which have often been raised in 
other contexts of online regulation.174 
 
 170. See Suler, supra note 162, at 322 (acknowledging the anonymity of 
agents over the internet). 
 171. See Facebook Statistics and Facts, MARKET.US, 
https://perma.cc/B3AB-SE9L (last updated Aug. 4, 2020) (demonstrating that 
Facebook, a platform that facilitates livestreaming, has billions of active users 
from all over the world). 
 172. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.171 (requiring a bystander to 
report a crime if a reasonable person would believe it had not yet been 
reported), with MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (2020) (implementing a duty to assist in 
emergencies). 
 173. Arguably, this scenario could also occur in the physical realm, as an 
individual might be physically present in one jurisdiction, while viewing a 
perilous situation that occurs in another, raising jurisdictional questions of 
legal interpretation of the statute in question. 
 174. The legal debate on territorial regulations and the virtual boarders of 
the internet has received much scholarly attention. See generally David R. 
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—the Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (discussing uncertainty of jurisdictions given the 
lack of geographical borders in cyberspace); JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO 
CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006) (exploring 
how the internet is bordered and postulating that in some cases there is a 
national or jurisdictional control exercised); Jennifer Daskal, Borders and 
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 Enforcement is also a substantial challenge. Aside from 
the aforementioned jurisdictional problem that could be 
challenging from an enforcement perspective, it would also be 
difficult for enforcement agencies to track down some users, that 
is, without infringing upon human rights and liberties, 
especially when these users could be numerous and potentially 
scattered all over the world.175 Even upon detection, it will be 
difficult to bring them to justice while also proving their active 
viewing of the livestream.176 It might also lead to biased 
selective enforcement against some users, and prosecutors 
might feel reluctant to file charges on these or other grounds.177 
Finally, given that bystanders are already rarely prosecuted in 
the physical world, prosecutions in the digital world will be even 
more challenging and unlikely.178 This is amplified by the low 
deterrent value of many current penalties.179 
 These challenges are substantial from both pragmatic and 
legal perspectives. It is unlikely that online bystanders will play 
a role as legally bound Samaritans. It is also generally 
undesirable and seems more likely that the law will play a 
 
Bits, 71 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2018) (exploring the jurisdictional reach of law 
enforcement with respect to data transmitted across borders). 
 175. See Janet Davidson, Why It’s So Hard to Catch Online Predators, CBC 
NEWS (Oct. 17, 2012, 5:23 AM), https://perma.cc/B9CM-3DJS (last updated 
Oct. 18, 2012) (noting that online criminals can take multiple actions to 
preserve their anonymity, how the volume of internet activity makes 
identifying individual offenders difficult, and how in some cases, such as the 
reporting of humans rights violations, this can be a good thing). 
 176. See Malone, supra note 156 (raising the practical difficulties of 
tracking down online offenders). 
 177. See Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 145–47 (highlighting the 
disproportionate enforcement of bad Samaritan laws when the bystander 
might have been involved in the crime and referencing Nevada prosecutors 
who feel “that individuals who fail to report will be unwilling to come forward 
as witnesses at a later date for fear of prosecution under the statute”). 
 178. See Givelber, supra note 13, at 3172–95 n.213 (reporting how eight 
different states’ bad Samaritan laws resulted in very few convictions). 
 179. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(c) (2019) (establishing that a violation 
of the bad Samaritan duty in Vermont cannot result in a fine greater than 
$100). 
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limited part—if any—in regulating online bad Samaritans.180 
Subjecting online viewers to affirmative duties to report will be 
both a constitutional and legal challenge, even if the state can 
assert its interest in protecting individuals from harmful 
activities,181 as it will not likely be considered as narrowly 
tailored to achieve the state’s interest, considering the existence 
of other potential, less intrusive measures that could better 
achieve this interest.182 If people tend to aid each other in the 
physical world regardless of a legal obligation to do so, then 
perhaps some online spectators will act accordingly.183  
Still, online platforms might play a crucial role with or 
without direct regulation. As these livestreams might be proven 
crucial for evidence, policymakers could, for instance, oblige 
online platforms that enable livestreaming in general to retain 
the data, at least for a time, even if they decide to block the 
livestream from the general public.184 The problem might arise 
from technologies whose infrastructure purposely limits the 
time any streaming is accessible to other users, and hence, is 
 
 180. Notably, end-users that are not entirely passive in the livestreaming, 
e.g., they comment on the crime or the victim, might be subjected to various 
forms of liability, depending on their communication, such as defamation. 
 181. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (asserting that a 
governmental interest in protecting children from harmful content on the 
internet was generally outweighed by the First Amendment rights of other 
internet users); Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 146 (exploring how 
reporting requirements bring the interest of the government in protecting its 
citizens in direct conflict with the citizens’ constitutional right to free speech 
through the forced speech inherent in the reporting). 
 182. See Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 146–47 (illustrating that 
alternatives to bad Samaritan laws can be equally effective without infringing 
constitutional rights). 
 183. See generally Hyman, supra note 55 (providing evidence that while 
bad Samaritan laws were often enacted due to anecdotal events, people tend 
to attempt rescuing each other in most cases). 
 184. See Michael H. Keller, Bipartisan Bill Targets Online Spread of Child 
Sex Abuse Material, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/9SX6-C8UJ 
(reporting on legislative efforts to lengthen the period of time that tech 
companies must retain data of illegal photos and videos on their platforms).  
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more disposable in nature.185 But while evidence is important, 
it does not directly relate to bad Samaritans rationales.186 
If policymakers insist on regulating such conduct online, 
then perhaps non-traditional regulatory mechanisms might 
prove successful. Law enforcement agencies could, for instance, 
strengthen their already established public-private 
partnerships to aid in crime detection, perhaps even creating a 
joint taskforce.187 But given the potential negative impact of 
livestreaming crimes on individuals, the state might also decide 
to vote against imposing bad Samaritan duties online in 
general, and fight against these livestreams, while pushing 
towards regulating the removal of such content. In some 
jurisdictions, they might even turn their partnerships with the 
private sector to be somewhat legally mandated, thus imposing 
liability on social media platforms that fail to quickly remove 
violent material from their platforms.188 
This debate obviously extends beyond bad Samaritans laws, 
as it includes the rather controversial discussion on content 
 
 185. See Josh Constine, Instagram Launches Disappearing Live Video and 
Message, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 21, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://perma.cc/8BYZ-
EJG8 (“Instagram Live lets you broadcast video to your followers in real-time, 
but they can only watch while you’re still streaming. No replays.”).  
 186. See Hyman, supra note 55, at 656 (observing that proponents of bad 
Samaritan laws justify them under the rationale that they would decrease 
bystander inaction in emergencies). 
 187. In Australia, for example, a social media taskforce was formed to stop 
the publication of violent terror content and to keep Australians safe online. 
See Media Release, Scott Morrison, Prime Minister of Australia, Stronger 
Action Against Terror Content (June 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/JQ4A-3SRQ 
(announcing the taskforce); see also Craig Timberg et al., The New Zealand 
Shooting Shows How YouTube and Facebook Spread Hate and Violent 
Images—Yet Again, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2019, 6:01 PM), 
https://perma.cc/BT83-9VHQ (“The department said it is working with social 
media platforms to remove the clips and urged the public to report 
objectionable content if they come across it.”). 
 188. See Press Release, Christian Porter, Att’y Gen. for Austl., Tough New 
Laws to Protect Australians from Live-Streaming Violent Crimes (Mar. 30, 
2019), https://perma.cc/C6B7-DZDW 
[T]he Criminal Code Amendment (Unlawful Showing of Abhorrent 
Violent Material) Bill 2019 will include new offences with penalties 
of up [to] 10 per cent of a company’s annual turnover and potential 
prison sentences for executives of social media companies who fail 
to act to remove abhorrent violent material from their platforms. 
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manipulation and removal in general.189 Currently, however, 
this discussion might sound redundant as online platforms in 
the United States are not likely to be held accountable for most 
of the content that is present on their platforms.190 This is due 
to the prevailing interpretation of § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act,191 which exempts platforms from liability 
regarding third-party content that the platforms host,192 
including violent or offensive materials.193 The general 
normative justification of such immunity was that in order to 
preserve free speech online, we must avoid viewpoint-based 
regulations and problems of collateral censorship, i.e., adopting 
intermediary liability rules that will cause over-censorship of 
 
 189. See Michal Lavi, Do Platforms Kill?, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 
525–43 (2020) (exploring arguments for and against imposing liability on 
intermediaries for undesirable content that they might host); Nellie Bowles, 
The Complex Debate Over Silicon Valley’s Embrace of Content Moderation, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/X3KD-AQ5X (last updated June 
30, 2020) (discussing debate over the extent to which tech companies should 
regulate or moderate content on their platforms). 
 190. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 
(9th Cir. 2008) (“If you don’t encourage illegal content, or design your website 
to require users to input illegal content, you will be immune.”). 
 191.  47 U.S.C. § 230. 
 192. See id. (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”); Eric Goldman, The Ten Most Important 
Section 230 Rulings, 20 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2–9 (2017) (recounting 
examples of how the courts have systematically held that this immunity 
stands). But see Safia Samee Ali, Who Is Responsible for Stopping 
Livestreamed Crimes?, NBC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2017, 2:17 PM), 
https://perma.cc/2DBY-FKLS (emphasizing that platforms have a legal 
obligation to terminate streaming and notify law enforcement of child 
pornography); Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in 
Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 569, 594–96 (2001) (reporting that initially Congressmembers wanted 
some requirements for platforms to screen out pornographic content); Danielle 
Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad 
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 403–23 (2017) 
(criticizing § 230 and suggesting that it should be adjusted through legislation 
or altered judicial interpretation). 
 193. See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 
116–17 (2009) (noting sweeping immunity under § 230 even for content with 
a violent or offensive nature). 
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otherwise protected content.194 In other words, from a legal 
perspective, it is currently difficult to regulate conduct like 
livestreaming crimes by mandating platforms to either enable 
or disable them. 
The legal constraints do not, however, rule out the 
aforementioned voluntary partnership. Indeed, in some 
instances, platforms like Facebook and YouTube were very 
responsive to alerts by law enforcement agencies regarding 
livestreaming crimes, and quickly stopped or deleted these 
videos upon such alerts.195 Some companies have even invested 
in automated systems to detect such undesired content,196 hired 
 
 194. See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2309–10 (2014) [hereinafter Balkin, 
Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation] (defining collateral censorship as 
the over-censorship of protected content incentivized by a state holding one 
private party liable for another party’s speech); Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech 
in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School 
Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1176–77 (2018) [hereinafter 
Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society] (asserting that collateral 
censorship is a direct corollary of intermediary liability rules and involves 
limiting freedom of speech); see generally Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech 
on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651 (2017) (providing more information 
about criminal and terrorist speech in the context of social media). 
 195. In the case of the New Zealand shooting video on March 15, 2019, Mia 
Garlick, Facebook’s director of policy in Australia and New Zealand, said: 
“New Zealand Police alerted us to a video on Facebook shortly after the 
livestream commenced and we quickly removed both the shooter’s Facebook 
and Instagram accounts and the video.” She further provided that: “We’re also 
removing any praise or support for the crime and the shooter or shooters as 
soon as we’re aware. We will continue working directly with New Zealand 
Police as their response and investigation continues.” Jason Abbruzzese & 
Brandy Zadrozny, Streamed to Facebook, Spread on YouTube: New Zealand 
Shooting Video Circulates Online Despite Takedowns, NBC NEWS (Mar. 15, 
2019, 11:53 AM), https://perma.cc/XUQ9-HDTU. 
 196. One mechanism that platforms often use in the context of copyrighted 
materials and pornography is creating a marked copy (a hash) and 
automatically blacklisting those who repost it online. This method, however, 
has proved ineffective in many instances. See Timberg et al., supra note 187 
(explaining the hash method); Samee Ali, supra note 192 (“When things 
happen in real time, you don’t know that will happen next and it’s extremely 
difficult for automated technology to monitor live events . . . .”). In the context 
of AI systems that will detect livestreaming crimes, Facebook claims that it 
will invest $7.5 million in “new research partnerships with leading academics 
from three universities, designed to improve image and video analysis 
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extra staff to manually “monitor and promptly remove violent 
content,”197 and publicly opposed the posting of such content by 
users.198  
While simply examples at this point, these incidents might 
reveal how the concept of bad Samaritans might lose the battle 
for values of protecting individuals from harmful materials. 
Bear in mind, however, that these platforms are often reluctant 
to remove content as it resides within the heart of surveillance 
capitalism.199 Thus, they might feel conflicted between content 
removal per law enforcement agencies’ requests and 
maintaining the content to retain its profit potential.200 If 
society deems the viewership of livestreaming crime as 
inappropriate, then social norms should attempt to shape, or 
even simply nudge, the market to provide appropriate tools for 
users to report these streams.201 Online platforms, in turn, 
might react to consumers’ expectations and enable, or even 
 
technology.” Jon Russell, Facebook Introduces ‘One Strike’ Policy to Combat 
Abuse of its Livestreaming Service, TECHCRUNCH (May 15, 2019, 2:09 AM), 
https://perma.cc/6SA7-Z9ZB. 
 197. See Hashela Kumarawansa, Facebook Live Acts Against 
Livestreaming Crime, SBS NEWS (Apr. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/89JV-Q6L8. 
 198. See Samee Ali, supra note 192 (quoting a Facebook spokeswoman as 
saying “[w]e take our responsibility to keep people safe on Facebook very 
seriously and will remove videos that depict sexual assault and are shared to 
glorify violence”). 
 199. Surveillance capitalism generally refers to the commodification of 
personal data for profit. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF 
SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2019) (examining the concept of surveillance 
capitalism, how it differs from traditional capitalism, and how it should be 
restricted or limited). According to Becca Lewis, a researcher at Stanford and 
the think tank Data & Society, online companies “have a content-moderation 
problem that is fundamentally beyond the scale that they know how to deal 
with . . . . The financial incentives are in play to keep content first and 
monetization first.” See Timberg et al., supra note 187 (quoting Lewis). 
 200. See Timberg et al., supra note 187 (pointing out that companies are 
economically incentivized not to tightly moderate content). 
 201. See Maria Shao, Social Pressures Affect Corporate Strategy and 
Performance, STAN. SCH. BUS. (Dec. 1, 2009), https://perma.cc/7U2Q-WKN8 
(“Greater social pressure can result in better social performance. In other 
words, firms step up responsible behavior in response to pressure.”). 
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promote, such notifications with them or with law enforcement 
agencies.202 
Thus, platforms, even without direct binding regulation, 
could play a substantial role in regulating online Samaritans. 
With potential technical limitations,203 they might, for instance, 
decide that such content—regardless of its potential benefits for 
those in peril—should not be promoted on their platforms and 
thus act to remove it regardless of whether it was communicated 
to enforcement agencies. Many websites and social platforms 
currently include some form of a flagging mechanism to report 
inappropriate or otherwise abusive content.204 To enhance 
collective action and avoid the bystander effect (or 
syndrome)— where one might suspect that others have already 
flagged the event and thus be reluctant to do so—platforms 
could communicate to their users whether the livestream was 
already flagged or not.205 
The role of platforms in the governance of behavior, further 
discussed in Part IV, holds great significance beyond the 
question of livestreaming perilous situations. But overall, the 
internet greatly challenges the fact that individuals might now 
 
 202. Ari Waldman, a leading authority on law and technology, argued that 
“[p]latforms that have a history of not just allowing harassment to occur, but 
failing to do anything when they hear about harassment, we have to make a 
choice to not use those platforms.” See Malone, supra note 156 (quoting Ari 
Waldman). 
 203. In the livestreaming of the slaughter in two New Zealand mosques in 
2019, social media platforms were highly limited in their ability to prevent the 
content dissemination. See Timberg et al., supra note 187 (reporting on a rapid 
spread of the footage that could not be stopped). 
 204. See, e.g., How do I Report a Live Video?, FACEBOOK (2020), 
https://perma.cc/XHE4-WV4V (instructing how to report a live video on 
Facebook); Report Inappropriate Content, YOUTUBE (2020), 
https://perma.cc/5E6S-EJG9 (allowing for inappropriate content on YouTube 
to be flagged); see also Vanessa Callison-Burch et al., Building a Safer 
Community with New Suicide Prevention Tools, FACEBOOK (Mar. 1, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/YD89-2JE9 (detailing Facebook’s suicide prevention tools for 
posts and livestreams); How to Report Things on Facebook, FACEBOOK (2020), 
https://perma.cc/357X-X8P8 (giving general information about how to report 
various types of content on Facebook); Kate Crawford & Tarleton Gillespie, 
What Is a Flag For? Social Media Reporting Tools and the Vocabulary of 
Complaint, 18 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 410, 411 (2016) (providing information on 
flagging systems in social media). 
 205. See Samee Ali, supra note 192. 
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become spectators of felonies or other perilous situations, 
without having a physical presence in the scene, while also 
potentially increasing the number of other individuals who will 
become such spectators due, to some extent, to their own 
actions. 
Whether it will be policymakers, platforms, or end-users 
who shape and reconstruct the ways in which these livestreams 
will be regulated, they must also account for both the benefits 
and drawbacks of such technology in light of the moral and 
social responsibilities of society. Eventually, the answer to this 
conundrum will partially lie within the hands of users, deciding 
whether and how to report, as long as platforms enable it.206 
Notably, altruism and acts of kindness often occur online, e.g., 
helpful and quick replies to requests for information, in online 
gaming, and in emotional support forums.207 It will also depend 
on online platforms, shaping how users report and where they 
stand on content removal in this context.208 But the ways that 
users react will greatly depend on social norms regarding such 
livestreams and their reporting, and must include sufficient 
awareness that could be promoted, at least to some extent, by 
educational programs for users that will rely on the social duty 
for societal members in the online environment.209 
Normatively, however, this question could be broader, in 
the sense that Samaritan laws might require reevaluating and 
adapting to this relatively new form of bystander that uses 
non-traditional measures to report crimes to the online 
community as a whole rather than directly to law enforcement 
agencies.210 But new forms of bystanders might also begin to 
 
 206. See Malone, supra note 156 (urging people to report online crime); 
Pranjal Gupta et al., Live Crime Reporting, 5 IRJET 2927, 2928–30 (2018) 
(proposing an app that would streamline anonymous live-crime reporting).  
 207. For more on online altruism and acts of human kindness, see 
WALLACE, supra note 34, at 190–207. 
 208. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.  
 209. See Anne Kleinsasser et al., An Online Bystander Intervention 
Program for the Prevention of Sexual Violence, 4 PSYCH. VIOLENCE 227, 232– 33 
(2015) (detailing the success of a bystander intervention program for sexual 
assault prevention). But see Swan, supra note 34, at 991–94 (highlighting the 
limitations of bystander intervention training programs and casting 
skepticism towards their supposed success). 
 210. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text. 
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form—digital bystanders relying on AI technology that could aid 
platforms in automatically detecting potential crimes in real 
time. The Samaritan duties that could be imposed on these new 
“artificial bystanders” will be further discussed and evaluated 
in the following Part III.B. 
B.  Artificial Bystanderism 
Much like almost any other law, Samaritan laws were 
initially crafted to regulate human conduct.211 But technological 
advancement in the field of AI, where non-humans are becoming 
more interpretative of human conduct, including potential 
criminal activity, opens the floor to introduce a rather new form 
of Samaritans—artificial ones.212 This new potential form of 
Samaritans could soon become a reality due to advancement in 
developments of AI and the Internet of Things (IoT), whereby 
regular objects (or “things”) have become connected to the 
internet,213 along with the increasing possibilities of these 
devices using sensors and advanced speech recognition or 
natural language processing (NLP) capabilities. Coupled with 
 
 211. See United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 295 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(Posner, J., dissenting) (“The purpose of criminal laws is to bring about 
compliance with desired norms of behavior.”). 
 212. See John O. McGinnis, Accelerating AI, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 366, 
368– 72 (2010) (asserting that functional AI is possible and touting the 
potential for AI to aid in social decision-making). 
 213. The term “Internet of Things” (IoT) describes devices or sensors that 
“connect, communicate or transmit information with or between each other 
through the Internet.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & 
SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD 6 (2015), https://perma.cc/99HS-Z62B 
(PDF); accord Kevin Ashton, That ‘Internet of Things’ Thing, RFID J. (June 
22, 2009), https://perma.cc/BE62-K8EG (encouraging the development of 
computers that gather information on their own). For other legal 
considerations that relate to IoT, see Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet 
of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, 
and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 98–117 (2014) (surveying numerous types of 
sensors tying objects into the IoT); see generally Eldar Haber, Toying with 
Privacy: Regulating the Internet of Toys (IoToys), 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (2019) 
(discussing IoT in the context of toys); Eldar Haber, The Wiretapping of 
Things, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 733 (2019) [hereinafter Haber, The Wiretapping 
of Things] (discussing IoT and wiretapping); Dan Feldman & Eldar Haber, 
Measuring and Protecting Privacy in the Always-on Era, 35 BERKELEY TECH. 
L. REV. 197 (2020) (suggesting computational solutions to privacy in IoT 
devices). 
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machine learning algorithms,214 we are likely to advance to a 
stage where digital devices could sufficiently assess, at least to 
a high level of statistical probability, when a perilous situation 
occurs, often a crime being committed, and whether victims are 
involved.215 
Consider the following running example. A woman runs her 
daily route while wearing a smart wearable, like a Fitbit or an 
Apple Watch.216 After running several miles, the wearable 
detects that the user’s vital signs show unusual levels of stress, 
faster heart beats than expected, and that her location indicates 
that she has strayed far off her regular, or any other runnable, 
running route. At this point, aggregation and analysis of the 
user’s data could provide a statistical analysis of the likelihood 
that she might be in grave danger.217 
 
 214. Natural Language Processing (NLP) combined with Machine 
Learning (ML) “helps computers to autonomously learn tasks such as the 
recognition, understanding and generation of natural language (i.e. the 
language spoken by humans).” Thomas Margoni, Artificial Intelligence, 
Machine Learning and EU Copyright Law: Who Owns AI? 2 (CREATE, 
Working Paper No. 2018/12, 2018).  
 215. The algorithms that power many of current AI-based devices 
generally “use models of probability to make educated guesses.” Matt Day et 
al., Thousands of Amazon Workers Listen to Alexa Users’ Conversations, TIME 
(Apr. 11, 2019, 2:04 PM), https://perma.cc/WK8J-SXVU. It follows that AI 
could also make educated guesses on the probability of a crime being 
committed. 
 216. Wearable IoT devices are often used to monitor the body. See Erika J. 
Nash, Notice and Consent: A Healthy Balance Between Privacy and Innovation 
for Wearables, 33 BYU J. PUB. L. 197, 199 (2018) (listing various ways that 
wearables measure information about their users). Key examples in the 
fitness industry include Fitbit, Jump, and the Samsung and Apple 
smartwatches. These devices will often gather large quantities of data on the 
user’s physical activities and other related health metrics, e.g., an individual’s 
heart rate or quality of sleep. See ANDREW HILTS ET AL., EVERY STEP YOU FAKE: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FITNESS TRACKER PRIVACY AND SECURITY 5– 7 
(2016), https://perma.cc/8D5D-28SK (PDF) (explaining how fitness wearables 
function and demonstrating the growth of sales by leaders in the 
fitness-wearable industry); Hillary Brill & Scott Jones, Little Things and Big 
Challenges: Information Privacy and the Internet of Things, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 
1183, 1190–91 (2017) (citing the fitness industry as one of the primary drivers 
of wearable IoT devices). 
 217. Essentially, equipped with proper sensors, IoT devices could gather 
various types of data and when aggregated and analyzed, could indicate, to 
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Another example could be that of computerized personal 
assistants, like Amazon Echo or Google Home,218 that detect, to 
a high probability, that a felony is currently being committed 
within one’s house. Consider an Amazon Echo device that, while 
operating in one’s house, detects aggregated signs of harsh 
domestic violence. To take this example further, suppose that 
using biometric voice recognition and identification, the Echo 
device computes that the domestic violence is committed by 
 
some statistical probability at least, that a crime is being committed. These 
sensors could include, inter alia, emotion sensing (detecting, e.g., heartbeat 
and body temperature), emotion recording, and geolocation. See, e.g., 
Jeong-Yong Bryun et al., Internet of Things for Smart Crime Detection, 7 
CONTEMP. ENG’G SCIS. 749, 752 (2014) (proposing a method of crime detection 
relying on wearable sensors). 
 218. Computerized personal assistants—IoT devices—are often 
voice-activated and awaiting a voice command. Users can communicate with 
them for various purposes. See Ricky Philip, Is the Future of Web Application 
Development Affected by the Disruptive Growth and Impact of IoT?, IT 
CHRONICLES (Sept. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/AV9R-TZMZ (“Personal 
assistants operate via an IoT database as they extrapolate users’ requests, 
notes, and even answer their questions.”). Google, for instance, described their 
personal assistant (Google Home) by “Ask your Google Assistant questions. 
Tell it to do things. It’s your own Google, always ready to help.” See Google 
Nest Devices, GOOGLE (2020), https://perma.cc/B338-UYSQ (describing 
different Google Home devices). Amazon released the Echo device, describing 
it as: 
[A] hands-free speaker you control with your voice. Echo connects 
to the Alexa Voice Service to play music, make calls, send and 
receive messages, provide information, news, sports scores, 
weather, and more—instantly. All you have to do is ask. Echo has 
seven microphones and beam forming technology so it can hear you 
from across the room—even while music is playing. Echo is also an 
expertly tuned speaker that can fill any room with 360° immersive 
sound. When you want to use Echo, just say the wake word “Alexa” 
and Echo responds instantly. If you have more than one Echo or 
Echo Dot, Alexa responds intelligently from the Echo you’re closest 
to with ESP (Echo Spatial Perception). 
Amazon Echo, AMAZON, https://perma.cc/3NMM-Y3N2; see also Haber, The 
Wiretapping of Things, supra note 213, at 745–47 (describing IoT devices, 
while differentiating between always-ready and always on devices). For more 
on computerized personal assistants, see Top 22 Intelligent Personal 
Assistants or Automated Personal Assistants, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS TODAY, 
https://perma.cc/SM3D-ZLTH (analyzing and ranking personal assistant 
devices on the market). 
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members of the household, ruling out potential false positives 
that might result from unrelated background sounds. 
The normative question that these two examples raise is, 
supposing that technology could provide rather accurate 
estimations of crimes (or other perilous situations) in real time, 
should these devices, or their service providers, be placed under 
a legal obligation to aid those in peril, and mostly those who fall 
victim to violent criminal activities, thereby notifying law 
enforcement agents? In other words, should policymakers 
extend the scope of Samaritan laws to include AI platforms and 
services? 
Notably, while this discussion might seem in the realm of 
science fiction, it is not entirely so. For example, in one instance 
Amazon Echo allegedly notified police of an ongoing violent 
assault.219 Amazon, however, has rejected these claims for 
now,220 thus it is difficult to evaluate the existence of such 
practices by companies. What Amazon did confirm was that its 
employees, working to help improve the abilities of digital 
assistants and customer experience, were routinely listening to 
voice recordings captured by these devices and have heard 
recordings that were believed to be criminal in nature.221 
Amazon, however, instructed its workers not to report these 
incidents, under their legal interpretation that it is not 
Amazon’s responsibility to interfere.222 This last example, 
 
 219. See Christopher Mele, Did an Echo Call 911 During a Domestic 
Assault? Amazon Says No, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZMN7-
77TG. 
 220. See id. (reporting the statement of an Amazon spokeswoman, Rachel 
Hass, who stated that for the device to have made a call, “the receiving end 
[that is, the police] [need[ed] to also have Alexa calling and messaging set up” 
and indicating that the police did not have this capability).  
 221. See Day et al., supra note 215. 
 222. See id. Notably, in this instance, the workers were unable to identify 
which user made the recordings, thus, even if one would suggest that 
Samaritan duties could be imposed on the human element in this loop, and 
apart from the fact that these crimes were not livestreamed and have 
potentially ended, excludes them from any such Samaritan duty. See id. 
(“Employees do not have direct access to information that can identify the 
person or account as part of this workflow.”). Apple and Google also hire teams 
to examine the interpretation of their personal assistants (Siri and Google 
Home, respectively), but removes personally identifiable information from 
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however, does not shed light on potential artificial Samaritans, 
as it merely echoes the online Samaritans paradigm.223 But even 
if current AI technology might still not be placed in a proper 
position to serve as Samaritans, there are some indications that 
technology might be headed towards this direction. 
Prior to normatively evaluating whether it is socially and 
legally desirable to impose affirmative duties on artificial 
bystanders, a few caveats should be set. First, it is important to 
note that this Part excludes the rather controversial debate, 
often categorized under the rubric of AI and ethics, on whether 
AI should have legal rights and, if so, to what extent.224 While 
such debate holds scholarly importance, it captures 
disagreement that would not complement the present 
discussion on digital Samaritans. The second caveat relates to 
the potential overoptimistic nature of many to attribute AI with 
abilities it simply does not yet possess and perhaps never will.225 
 
these recordings, thus their employees are unable to act upon it, even if purely 
criminal in nature. See id. 
 223. See supra Part III.A.2.  
 224. One of the prominent questions in respect to legal rights is whether 
machines deserve to have a right of free speech. For more on this discussion, 
see Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 
1447 (2013) (“[I]f we accept Supreme Court jurisprudence, the First 
Amendment encompasses a great swath of algorithm-based 
decision— specifically, algorithm-based outputs that entail a substantive 
communication.”); James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
868, 917–31 (2014) (assessing various theories of whether search engine 
rankings are speech protected by the First Amendment and concluding that 
such rankings are “descriptive opinions” of relevance which may only be 
actionable in tort when “subjectively dishonest”); Toni M. Massaro & Helen 
Norton, Siri-ously?: Free Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1169, 1172 (2016) (examining whether computers with “strong AI”— AI 
that produces actual, independent thought—could hypothetically be treated 
as a speaker under the First Amendment); Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1495, 1526 (2013) (arguing that the “functional nature of search 
engines” does not preclude application of the First Amendment to search 
results); Hugh McLachlan, Ethics of AI: Should Sentient Robots have the Same 
Rights as Humans?, INDEPENDENT (June 26, 2019, 13:49), 
https://perma.cc/2EHR-SEPV (“To deny conscious persons moral respect and 
consideration on the grounds that they had artificial rather than natural 
bodies would seem to be arbitrary and whimsical.”). 
 225. For more on past overly optimistic predictions regarding the abilities 
of AI, see What Should we Learn from Past AI Forecasts?, OPEN PHILANTHROPY 
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Under this caveat, one might argue that the following debate on 
AI Samaritans is rather theoretical at this point, and might 
remain as such. More specifically, AI technology has not yet 
reached the stage at which it could accurately estimate the 
probability that a crime is being committed, and it might never 
reach it. 
Can AI technology accurately report on crimes being 
committed? At the current stage of technology, it would be 
presumptuous to answer this question in the affirmative.226 
Truly, technology is advancing at a rapid pace, and it enables 
companies to capture and store mass amount of data on 
individuals, sometimes at any given time.227 Wearable IoTs 
could monitor and store various types of data that could include 
heart rate, sexual activity, sleep patterns, steps taken, and 
geolocation, to name but a few examples.228 It is expected that 
IoT and AI technology will continue to develop in years to come 
 
(May 2016), https://perma.cc/SN3C-2YAD (last updated Sept. 2016) 
(summarizing the optimism during the 1950s through the 1980s regarding 
rapid development of AI). 
 226. See infra notes 232−236 and accompanying text. 
 227. I have termed this technology elsewhere as “always-on” devices, 
“equipped with sensors [that] could theoretically capture all data in the 
vicinity of these sensors, depending on the type of data that the sensor could 
capture.” See Haber, The Wiretapping of Things, supra note 213, at 748–52 
(explaining and offering examples of the “datafication of things”). For more on 
always-on devices and the “datafication of things,” see Katharine Saphner, 
Note, You Should Be Free to Talk the Talk and Walk the Walk: Applying Riley 
v. California to Smart Activity Trackers, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1689, 1689−93, 
1715 (2016). 
 228. To exemplify, Fitbit currently collects “identifiers,” “demographic 
information,” “commercial information,” “biometric information,” “internet or 
other electronic network activity information,” “geolocation data,” “electronic, 
visual, or similar information,” “professional or employment related 
information,” information provided by the user, and “inferences drawn from 
any of the above.” Fitbit Privacy Policy, FITBIT (Dec. 18, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/QJD2-Y4EG; see Haber, The Wiretapping of Things, supra 
note 213, at 749 (“Wearable IoT devices or smart activity trackers could 
monitor various types of data, such as heart rate, sexual activity, sleep 
patterns, steps taken, calorie consumption, and geolocation.”). 
Haber.PostBlueline.docx (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  4:56 PM 
THE DIGITAL SAMARITANS  1611 
 
and will open a world of possibilities not necessarily imaginable 
right now.229 
When it comes to law enforcement, AI has already started 
assuming a role in which the data gathered by these devices is 
often used ex post as evidence.230 Currently, however, this 
technology might not be able to accurately detect when 
individuals are in a perilous situation. Even devices that are 
considered relatively innovative and in advanced stages of 
development might create many false positives or false 
negatives.231 Computerized personal assistants might, for 
instance, capture someone saying, “You are killing me!” and 
determine that a crime is being committed. In practice, however, 
the exclamation might have been merely a euphemism, a joke, 
storytelling, rehearsal of a play, or simply sounds from the TV, 
to name a few examples.232  
 Some of these practical challenges might be met with the 
use of other technological advancements, like that of biometric 
data and voice recognition that could aid the device in 
identifying the speakers, thereby reducing chances that the 
data was not communicated by another person or medium.233 
However, even utilizing those assistive technologies, it would 
still be difficult for AI devices to evaluate and interpret the 
 
 229. See, e.g., Louis Columbus, 2018 Roundup of Internet of Things 
Forecasts and Market Estimates, FORBES (Dec. 13, 2018, 11:49 AM), 
https://perma.cc/HD49-HF7H (“Combined, businesses, governments, and 
consumers will invest nearly $1.6 trillion to install IoT solutions in 2020.”). 
 230. See, e.g., Christine Hauser, Police Use Fitbit Data to Charge 
90-Year-Old Man in Stepdaughter’s Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/A723-MJDR (describing how data from a Fitbit was used as 
evidence to resolve a murder); Hauser, supra note 6 (same).  
 231. See infra notes 232, 234−236 and accompanying text. 
 232. For various reported stories on how Amazon’s Alexa misunderstood 
requests, or picked up requests from the TV, see Gia Liu, Hey, I didn’t order 
this Dollhouse! 6 Hilarious Alexa Mishaps, DIGIT. TRENDS (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/TC3Y-EBXA. 
 233. See generally Oscar Knagg, Building a Speaker Identification System 
from Scratch with Deep Learning, MEDIUM (Oct. 2, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/9MA8-FTHU (describing how to create a high-accuracy voice 
recognition system using neural networks). 
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context of human speech.234 Here, a human witnessing such 
interaction is likely to comprehend the situation better than any 
machine.235 Thus, to date, the available technology is probably 
not yet in a phase where it could compute human interactions 
better than humans, and, as mentioned, it could lead to many 
inaccurate computations.236 
But as technology is quickly evolving, along with the 
financial investments in the field of AI and IoT, such crime 
notification could be possible, and perhaps will become a reality 
soon. Thus, assuming for now that AI technology might pass 
these thresholds and barriers and will be able to properly detect 
crimes in real time, the normative question is should the AI 
device—or the companies that analyze the users’ data and reach 
a conclusion that a crime (or another perilous situation) is being 
committed—be legally obligated to contact law enforcement 
agencies, thus creating a new category of bystanderism in the 
form of “artificial Samaritans”? What are the benefits and 
drawbacks of imposing legal liability on technological 
 
 234. See Day et al., supra note 215 (articulating that AI devices have 
difficulties interpreting speech, “especially when grappling with new slang, 
regional colloquialisms or languages other than English”). 
 235. Self-driving cars, for instance, have experienced problems in 
interpreting risks and hazards. One example is an Uber self-driving car, that 
“interpreted a pedestrian and her bike as a plastic bag or piece of cardboard,” 
along with other mistakes that humans will not likely make. See Aarian 
Marshall, The Uber Crash Won’t Be the Last Shocking Self-Driving Death, WIRED 
(Mar. 31, 2018, 07:00 AM), https://perma.cc/M4TG-7592 (emphasizing that 
“[e]ven little things”—such as small pieces of tape on road signs, shimming 
exhaust, and adverse weather conditions including fog—“have been observed 
to fool” AI systems).  
 236. Computerized personal assistants, those that are AI-based, often 
mistakenly interpret humans. Amazon Alexa, for instance, accidentally 
recorded a conversation of a husband and wife and sent it to one of their 
contacts without permission. See Hamza Shaban, An Amazon Echo Recorded 
a Family’s Conversation, Then Sent It to a Random Person In Their Contacts, 
Report Says, WASH. POST (May 24, 2018, 6:40 PM), https://perma.cc/JD9D-
R69E (“[T]he Echo woke up when it heard a word that sounded like ‘Alexa’ 
and interpreted any subsequent conversation as a ‘send message’ request”); 
see also Day et al., supra note 215 (“I think we’ve been conditioned to the 
[assumption] that these machines are just doing magic machine learning. But 
the fact is there is still manual processing involved.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Florian Schaub)). 
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companies in this context? And will it be legally plausible and 
normatively desirable? 
 Evaluating whether to impose obligations on AI operators 
to report crimes could first be linked to the theoretical roots and 
justifications of imposing Samaritan duties to begin with.237 As 
mentioned in Part II, tracing its historical roots, duty-to-report 
statutes were often responsive to specific incidents that sparked 
a public outcry following humans’ non-intervention in instances 
where they morally should have aided the victim or, at the very 
least, reported the crime. Hence, at least one of the rationales 
behind Samaritan laws is linked to the public shaping of what 
constitutes a socially acceptable or moral behavior.238  
At this point, one might argue that the rationale should not 
extend to non-humans. These machines are not part of the social 
fabric.239 They are also in no need of moral education.240 On this 
last point, one might even argue that Samaritan laws are driven 
by the need to educate others on aiding—and less on the crime 
committed—i.e., that lacking a human to educate, there is little 
(if any) social need for “artificial Samaritan” duties. On the 
other hand, the fact that Samaritan laws emerged from a 
specific social need does not mean that future legislation or 
other forms of regulations should not tilt these moral rationales 
towards the aid to those in peril, or even, the gathering of crucial 
evidence. 
 Imposing artificial Samaritan duties on AI devices or 
service operators necessitates a social and legal cost-benefit 
analysis, translated here into potential benefits and drawbacks. 
 
 237. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.  
 238. See Levy, supra note 41, at 617 (advocating for states to impose 
Samaritan laws on the basis of “formal recognition of a moral duty that we all 
owe to each other, a duty to attempt to save one another when the burden and 
risk are low and the potential benefits . . . are very high”). 
 239. See generally Joanna J. Bryson, The Past Decade and Future of AI’s 
Impact on Society, in TOWARDS A NEW ENLIGHTENMENT? A TRANSCENDENT 
DECADE 127 (11th ed. 2019) (presenting AI devices as powerful tools for 
humans to use, but which come with an inherent risk of devaluing human life 
and work in the future).  
 240. See Bryson, supra note 239, at 129−32 (defining artificial intelligence 
as a product of human coding and machine learning that allows the machine 
to (1) “perceive contexts for action”; (2) “act”; and (3) “associate contexts to 
actions”). 
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Obviously, imposing Samaritan duties on AI operators could aid 
in crime prevention and detection in both public and private 
spheres.241 When more technologies are readily available within 
public spheres, AI devices will be able to increase the personal 
safety of individuals, as these devices could contact law 
enforcement agencies when people are in danger and equip 
those agencies with crucial data to aid in ceasing the criminal 
activity or other perilous situations, while also obtaining 
evidence.242 This argument might become even more important 
for those crimes that often go under the radar or where evidence 
is scarce. The mitigation of these crimes rely mostly on human 
reporting and these crimes often go undetected due to the 
location of the crime, i.e., within one’s private sphere, like one’s 
home.243 Thus, imposing Samaritan duties could aid in the 
enforcement of criminal activities that are often not reported by 
victims and benefit victims who are unable to contact law 
enforcement agencies during the criminal conduct or otherwise 
perilous situation. 
 Moreover, imposing Samaritan duties on AI operators 
does not raise the major libertarian concern which Samaritan 
 
 241. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 242. See Douglas A. Fretty, Face-Recognition Surveillance: A Moment of 
Truth for Fourth Amendment Rights in Public Places, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 430, 
447 (2011) (“[B]y stepping in front of a face-identifying camera, a civilian is 
matched not only with his state-owned photograph but also any data 
associated with his name—residence, welfare status, employment, social 
security number, tax history, criminal record, child support compliance, 
etcetera.”); Jeong-Yong Byun & Aziz Nasridinov, supra note 217, at 752−53 
(enumerating a framework for AI detection of criminal activity). 
 243. Currently, many crimes go undetected simply because of the nature 
of the attack, and perhaps most commonly, crimes linked with domestic 
violence or sexual abuse. See Kaufman, supra note 19, at 1325 n.33 (quoting 
crime statistics indicating that “[o]nly 230 out of every 1,000 sexual assaults 
are reported to police”). To name two main reasons for why sexual violence 
victims are reluctant to report these crimes: they fear retaliation or have little 
faith that law enforcement agencies will aid them. See id. at 1337 (offering 
objections by survivors of sexual violence to mandatory reporting of sexual 
assaults). In addition, some individuals do not report or assist victims of 
crimes because they lack self-confidence to intervene. See Dickerson, supra 
note 165, at 62 (making the same argument with reference to bullying). 
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laws often raise—that of liberty.244 Samaritan duties are often 
criticized as undesirable due to undermining personal 
autonomy—something that machines do not currently (and are 
not expected to soon) have.245 Lacking any meaningful human 
element in the loop, Samaritan obligations will not impose 
direct liberty-limiting duties on humans, but rather, mostly on 
machines or, one might argue, AI companies.246 In other words, 
if technology could aid in preventing, detecting, and even 
obtaining evidence of criminal activities or other perilous 
situations, then artificial Samaritan duties will presumably be 
beneficial for society as a whole. 
At the same time, imposing a legal duty on AI operators and 
service providers to report crimes is both undesirable and 
implausible for various reasons, along with other potential 
challenges that arise from both legal and pragmatic aspects. 
While the devices might aid in increasing personal safety for 
 
 244. See Rogers, supra note 25, at 904–05 (examining the libertarian 
argument that Samaritan laws infringe on an individual’s “right not to 
rescue”).  
 245. See Montana, supra note 39, at 549 (“Opponents to duty to aid laws 
would argue that the personal autonomy principle should take precedent, 
especially when such laws aim to punish nonfeasance, not misfeasance—the 
key to liability for negligent and criminal acts in United States law.”); Rogers, 
supra note 25, at 904–05 (analyzing the libertarian argument that 
duty-to-rescue laws “infringe upon individual freedom by denying people the 
choice of whether to assist a person in peril”). 
 246. Truly, there are many humans involved in the process of creating and 
maintaining AI technology, thus they are not entirely exempt from the loop. 
See, e.g., Vyacheslav Polonski & Jane Zavalishina, Can We Build the Good 
Samaritan AI? Three Guidelines for Teaching Morality to Machines, CTR. FOR 
PUB. IMPACT (Dec. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/B8BV-63WN (emphasizing the 
human responsibility to teach machines to maximize fairness and to overcome 
racial and gender bias when making decisions). But within the context of 
live-reporting, other than having to program such ability within the device or 
service, the actual contacting will not be made by humans under this scenario. 
In other words, while requiring someone to program Samaritan duties could 
be considered as limiting the liberty of companies, it is not equivalent to the 
libertarian arguments in the context of human reporting. On the other hand, 
while AI Samaritan obligations will not impose direct liberty-limiting duties 
on humans, placing obligations on companies might in turn place limits on an 
individual’s liberty to decide on what the machine is permitted to divulge to 
law enforcement agencies or others. Thus, there is an indirect restriction of 
liberty on some individuals, even when the direct duties are imposed on 
intermediaries. 
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some individuals,247 mostly in specific events, such duties will 
trade off human rights and liberties in return.248 Normatively 
and legally speaking, Samaritan duties on AI platforms could be 
considered as too intrusive from a human rights perspective, 
potentially infringing upon privacy and freedom of expression 
rights of individuals. Imposing such duties on AI companies 
could also increase fears of data misuse249 by both private 
companies and, perhaps more dramatically, law enforcement 
and other intelligence agencies which will be able to receive 
more data on individuals without judicial safeguards or reliance 
on the companies’ willingness to voluntarily disclose such 
information.250 While criminal law always considers the impact 
on human rights and liberties when imposing any affirmative 
duty, the impact on these rights and liberties within the current 
Samaritan laws are inherently different within the context of 
AI, and thus must be rebalanced if imposed. 
Within the context of human rights and liberties, the 
privacy challenge is perhaps the most dominant factor against 
imposing any artificial Samaritan duties. The privacy challenge 
begins with a constitutional debate.251 The Fourth 
Amendment—the most relevant constitutional protection for 
 
 247. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 248. See Haber, The Wiretapping of Things, supra note 213, at 792 
(expressing that increased dependence on AI devices in one’s daily life—i.e. 
the “smartification of things”—could “increase the potential threat to privacy 
and other civil rights and liberties due to datamining and data analysis 
capabilities”).  
 249. See Andrew Smith, Using Artificial Intelligence and Algorithms, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (Apr. 8, 2020, 9:58 AM), https://perma.cc/S895-
M2M5 (“The use of AI technology . . . to make predictions, recommendations, 
or decisions . . . presents risks, such as the potential for unfair or 
discriminatory outcomes or the perpetuation of existing socioeconomic 
disparities.”). 
 250. See Bryson, supra note 239, at 139 (elucidating that AI enables third 
parties to access records on any individual that produces storable data and 
emphasizing that “[w]e are to some extent all celebrities now: any one of us 
can be identified by strangers, whether by facial-recognition software or 
datamining of shopping or social media habits”).  
 251. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth 
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2002) (“The first source for 
protecting privacy against infringement by law enforcement agencies is the 
Fourth Amendment . . . .”). 
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individuals’ privacy—protects “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects” from unreasonable and warrantless searches and 
seizures.252 This constitutional protection should extend 
generally to the data that is gathered from AI devices, as they 
will likely be categorized as “effects.”253 Even if not, many of 
these AI devices will likely be present within an individual’s 
house or worn by him or her and thus could generally fall under 
the Fourth Amendment protection of either houses or persons, 
respectively.254 Under the Supreme Court’s construction of the 
so-called reasonable expectation of privacy test, a Fourth 
Amendment “search” is conducted when there is both a 
subjective and objective expectation of privacy by individuals,255 
 
 252. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 
(1967) (emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to “[w]herever a man may be”). 
For more on the Fourth Amendment, see generally Solove, supra note 251. 
Notably, along with various protections by federal and state legislation, the 
right to privacy had been interpreted to be protected under the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Bill of Rights other than the Fourth Amendment, 
mostly within the First, Third, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See U.S. 
CONST. amends. I, III, V, XIV; Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 n.5 (referencing the ways 
in which the First, Third, and Fifth Amendments protect personal privacy); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(asserting that a right to privacy is incorporated to the states through the 14th 
Amendment Due Process Clause). 
 253. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Haber, The Wiretapping of Things, supra 
note 213, at 752 (making this argument as such technologies constitute “an 
individual’s personal property”); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of 
Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 853–64 
(2016) (arguing that an interpretation of IoT devices as Fourth Amendment 
“effects” is consistent with Fourth Amendment theory and interpretations of 
protection for persons, houses, and papers). 
 254. Compare Justice Potter Stewart’s view in the seminal Katz v. United 
States opinion, wherein he articulates that “[t]he Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 255. See id. at 359 (forming the reasonable expectation of privacy test, 
which has a twofold requirement to determine whether governmental conduct 
constitutes a search); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381−82 (2014) (“[T]he 
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” (quoting 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006))); see also William Baude & 
James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. 
L. REV. 1821, 1829 (2016) (articulating the two-part test as (1) determining 
whether a government agent committed an act “that can be characterized as 
either a search or seizure;” then (2) evaluating the act—if either a search or 
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that is, unless there is an exception to general warrant 
requirement.256 
But interpretation of current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence will likely lead to the outcome that the Fourth 
Amendment will not apply in most of these instances, as long as 
data sharing is consensual,257 and as long as the data is not 
stored only locally on the device. Under the so-called 
 
seizure—for its reasonableness); Jonathan Mayer, Government Hacking, 127 
YALE L.J. 570, 581–82 (2017) (reciting the reasonableness component of the 
test as judicial scrutiny of “the privacy procedures associated with” a 
government “search”). 
 256. Courts have created exceptions to the general reasonable expectation 
of privacy test. These examples include, inter alia, the Terry stop and frisk 
search (requiring reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause), items 
displayed in plain view during a search, exigent circumstances, and 
consensual searches. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469−70 (1985) 
(concluding that an undercover officer did not conduct a Fourth Amendment 
search or seizure when he, lacking a warrant, viewed and purchased adult 
magazines that were “intentionally exposed” on a store’s shelves, then 
arrested the store clerk for distribution of obscene material); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 466 (1971) (emphasizing that to overcome the 
presumption that extra-judicial searches are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, “there must be a showing by those who seek 
exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course 
imperative” (internal quotations omitted)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30−31 
(1968) (holding that an officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment for 
conducting a frisk search if he (1) has a reasonable suspicion that the person 
has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime and (2) has a 
reasonable belief that the person may be armed and presently dangerous); see 
generally Benjamin T. Clark, Why the Airport and Courthouse Exceptions to 
the Search Warrant Requirement Should Be Extended to Sporting Events, 40 
VAL. U. L. REV. 707, 715−23 (2006) (analyzing the consent, Terry stop and frisk, 
airport, and courthouse exceptions to the warrant requirement for a 
reasonable search and applying those exceptions to justify warrantless 
searches at sporting events); Haber, The Wiretapping of Things, supra note 
213, at 753 (noting that barring exceptions, law enforcement agencies “are 
required to obtain a warrant in most instances” before conducting a search). 
 257. Courts have repeatedly held that a consensual access to one’s home, 
even if predicated upon mistrust, nullifies Fourth Amendment protection. See 
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (“Neither this Court nor any 
member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects 
a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides 
his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”); Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on 
the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 
70 MD. L. REV. 614, 652−53 (2011) (“No court has held that the Constitution 
protects against misplaced trust.”). 
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“third-party doctrine,” and along with some notable 
exceptions,258 individuals who share information with a third 
party who is the intended recipient of the information—the AI 
platform in this instance—have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in that data.259 In other words, when individuals 
communicate with IoT devices and know that the gathered data 
could theoretically be subjected to Samaritan duties, these AI 
operators are permitted to legally divulge such information to 
law enforcement agencies without raising potential 
constitutional violations.260 
 
 258. At least in some jurisdictions, the contents of emails held by internet 
service providers will not be subjected to the third-party doctrine. See United 
States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285−86 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Given the 
fundamental similarities between email and traditional forms of 
communication, it would defy common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth 
Amendment protection.”); Haber, The Wiretapping of Things, supra note 213, 
at 756. (“[A]t least some types of communication will receive Fourth 
Amendment protection not subjected to the third-party 
doctrine[,] . . . includ[ing] the contents of emails . . . .”). For other exceptions 
see, for example, United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (“Letters 
and other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which the public 
at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy . . . .”); In re Search of Info. 
Associated with the Facebook Acct. Identified by the Username Aaron.Alexis 
that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Facebook, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6−7 
(D.D.C. 2013) (rejecting a search warrant application calling for account 
information for a Facebook user, stating that “it unduly invaded the privacy 
of third parties” because the government would see “irrelevant” 
communications “sent by persons who could not possibly have anticipated that 
the government would see what they posted”); Carpenter v. United States, 138 
S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (stating that accessing historical records containing 
the physical locations of cellphones is subject to Fourth Amendment 
protection). 
 259. Two leading Supreme Court cases constructed the third-party 
doctrine. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third 
party . . . even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be 
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party 
will not be betrayed.”); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) 
(emphasizing that when one reveals information to a third party, he 
“assume[s] the risk” that the information may be revealed to authorities). For 
more on the third-party doctrine, see generally Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond 
the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third 
Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, (2007); Orin S. Kerr, The 
Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009). 
 260. See cases cited supra note 259.  
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The privacy question further extends far beyond the 
constitutional level. There could be many forms of legislation or 
regulation that will restrict governmental access to the data in 
general, like that of wiretapping devices or using other legal 
frameworks to obtain stored data, but they might merely mirror 
the rationale to protect privacy in some instances.261 The fear 
here is that imposing Samaritan duties on AI companies, if at 
all legally and practically possible, will undermine users’ 
privacy in the same ways that the Constitution was set to 
protect privacy interests more than two centuries ago. It will 
broaden the ways law enforcement agencies can surveil 
individuals,262 and such data collection and analysis might lead 
to misuse, thereby threatening democracy. It would impose 
substantial constraints on individuals’ rights and liberties, and 
perhaps mostly on their right to privacy and on their right to 
free speech, as individuals will be reluctant to act freely in 
places where they should feel safe, such as in their own 
homes.263 If we acknowledge that privacy protection, like that 
 
 261. A key example is that of the Wiretap Act, The Stored 
Communications Act, and the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices 
Statute. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 
90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510−2522) 
(regulating real-time access to communication, including electronic 
communication); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-508, §§ 201−02, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860−1868 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2701−2713) (regulating access to the content and metadata stored 
by electronic communications services); Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 301−02, 100 Stat. 1848, 1868−1872 (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121−3127) (regulating access to devices that 
obtain information about calls); Haber, The Wiretapping of Things, supra note 
213, at 740−41 (noting that, in response to the impact of new technological 
developments on individual privacy, Congress implemented the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act to modify the Wiretap Act). For more on the 
stored communication act in the context of social media platforms, see 
Strandburg, supra note 257, at 643−48. 
 262. For more on governmental surveillance in the context of national 
security, see generally Niva Elkin-Koren & Eldar Haber, Governance by Proxy: 
Cyber Challenges to Civil Liberties, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2016). 
 263. The importance of protecting the home is often reflected within 
courts’ interpretations of the protection granted by the Fourth Amendment. 
See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961) (discussing 
the significance of an individual’s home within the Fourth Amendment 
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afforded at home by the Fourth Amendment, is crucial for 
individuals’ liberty,264 autonomy,265 and even democracy,266 then 
when homes become virtual, it would be difficult to argue why 
there should be such a vast difference in the privacy protection 
of them.267 Thus, privacy rights are closely linked in this scheme 
with other human rights and liberties, such as freedom of 
expression, and might be at great risk. 
The pragmatic issues of “artificial Samaritans” are 
non-negligible as well. Say that the rationale of fighting crimes 
that often go undetected due to lack of human reporting or 
domestic crimes within someone’s home is considered by 
policymakers as highly important.268 Would those who often 
commit such crimes—and their victims who are reluctant to 
notify—have their houses or bodies equipped with such 
devices?269 What will be the social response of users, even those 
 
protection); Strandburg, supra note 257, at 650, 658 (“The idea that the home 
is deserving of particular protection against government intrusion is deeply 
embedded in jurisprudence, culture, and popular and legal intuition.”). 
 264. See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968) (“Most 
obviously, privacy in its dimension of control over information is an aspect of 
personal liberty.”); Sonia K. McNeil, Note, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 199, 205−06 (2011) (“Privacy . . . is a facet of personal 
liberty, moral autonomy, and democracy.”). 
 265. See McNeil, supra note 264, at 206 (emphasizing the role of privacy 
in attaining individual goals). 
 266. See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 
455 (1980) (“Privacy is also essential to democratic government because it 
fosters and encourages the moral autonomy of the citizen, a central 
requirement of a democracy.”); McNeil, supra note 264, at 205−06. 
 267. For more on the potential shift to social media as a primary form of 
interaction, see Strandburg, supra note 257, at 655−57. 
 268. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 8769, 3 C.F.R. 8769 (2011) (“In our schools 
and in our neighborhoods, at home and in workplaces across our Nation, 
stalking endangers the physical and emotional well-being of millions of 
American men and women every year. Too often, stalking goes unreported and 
unaddressed, and we must take action against this unacceptable abuse.”).  
 269. See, e.g., Kaufman supra note 18, at 1325 n.33 (presenting statistics 
of sexual assault victims who do not report their assault); Dickerson, supra 
note 165, at 61 (“Some victims [of bullying] simply suffer in silence because 
they fear ostracism, retaliation, or escalation in the bullying.”). 
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who claim that they “have nothing to hide”270 from law 
enforcement agencies but fear the misuse of such power? There 
is a valid chance that such legal duties will drive many users 
away from using AI technology, hence creating a chilling effect 
on its use and on innovation.271 
Moreover, while for humans non-reporting of crimes or 
other perilous situations might be considered a morally wrong 
behavior, it does not currently apply to machines. The question 
is whether the notion of morality can be extended to those that 
operate and designed the technology. In other words, is it 
appropriate to impose moral obligations on those AI companies 
that produce the product or provide its related services? As Part 
II.A argued, imposing such moral obligations will reshape the 
liability safeguards that federal law seeks to provide 
communication technologies under § 230 of the Communication 
Decency Act.272 While § 230 deserves much criticism on various 
grounds,273 its reconstruction must be carefully evaluated due 
to the negative effects it might have on markets and innovation. 
It is also important to consider the fears that AI platforms 
will transform into law enforcement agents and serve as a proxy 
for law enforcement—all without the constitutional or other 
legal safeguards set to protect individuals, which do not 
generally apply to these platforms as they are not state actors 
 
 270. The “nothing to hide” argument is mostly linked to the debate 
between privacy and security, whereas, arguably, individuals should not fear 
governmental surveillance programs that detect criminal activities, if they are 
not involved in criminal activities. See Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to 
Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 
745−53 (2007) (explaining the “nothing to hide argument”). But these 
arguments are considered by many scholars as based on mistaken views of 
privacy. See id. at 764 (“[T]he problem with the nothing to hide argument is 
the underlying assumption that privacy is about hiding bad things.”). For more 
on the “nothing to hide” argument, see generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING 
TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY 21−33 (2011). 
 271. For a thorough analysis of the privacy-innovation tradeoff that occurs 
in many instances, see generally Tal Z. Zarsky, The Privacy-Innovation 
Conundrum, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 115 (2015). 
 272. See 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
 273. See, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 192, at 594−96 (discussing criticism to 
the immunity provision of § 230). 
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per se.274 If AI companies expand their role as proxies for law 
enforcement, then many individuals will likely be reluctant to 
use this technology, or even if they do use it, they will be very 
careful in what they say in its vicinity.275 They might even fear 
false positives and thus refrain from any speech that could be 
interpreted by the AI device as potential criminal activity or a 
perilous situation.276 To simplify this argument, while placing 
speech constraints might be considered acceptable in some 
contexts, such as not saying “bomb” in an airport, people should 
certainly feel that they can say “bomb” in their house.277 
 The cost-benefit analysis of imposing duties to report on 
AI devices currently tilts in the direction of not imposing 
artificial Samaritan duties. It will be proven as impractical (due 
to the current state of technology and legal constraints) and, 
perhaps more importantly, undesirable from both a legal and 
social perspective. At the same time, there should be little doubt 
 
 274. To be considered as a state actor, one must exercise powers that are 
“traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.” Jackson v. Metro. Edison 
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974). Thus, the First Amendment only applies to a 
state action, meaning that under current interpretation, online platforms are 
not considered as acting on behalf of the state. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 
501, 508−09 (1946) (establishing the state actor doctrine); Blum v. Yaretsky, 
457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) (applying the exclusive public function test); 
Langdon v. Google, 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 631−32 (D. Del. 2007) (concluding 
that Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft are private companies and working with 
state universities did not make them state actors subject to the First 
Amendment); see also Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, 
and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV 1598, 1609–13, 1658 
(2018) (reviewing the state action doctrine in the context of assessing 
intermediary liability for content on online platforms). 
 275. See Chavie Lieber, Amazon’s Alexa Might be a Key Witness in a 
Murder Case, VOX (Nov. 12, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://perma.cc/92SL-TX9M 
(“Americans are just waking up to the fact that their smart devices are going 
to snitch on them. And that they are going to reveal intimate details about 
their lives that they did not intend law enforcement to have.” (quoting an 
unnamed privacy expert)). 
 276. See Mele, supra note 219 (describing an instance of Siri contacting 
authorities in response a news station airing the phrase “‘Hey Siri, call 911’” 
which led to flood of accidental calls to emergency dispatchers from phones 
responding to the command). 
 277. See Jackie Salo, ‘Stupid Joke’ About Bomb on Plane Gets Woman 
Arrested, N.Y. POST (Feb. 14, 2019, 8:17 PM), https://perma.cc/3NHN-VXB2 
(stating that joking about a bomb in her carry-on bag led to the woman’s arrest 
for making “a false report over a bomb threat”). 
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that AI technology will play a role, and perhaps a substantial 
one, in law enforcement in the years to come.278 Beyond the 
current expanding use of the data gathered by AI or IoT devices 
for enforcement purposes, both ex post and in real time,279 it is 
likely that the smartification of the public sphere with the 
combination of biometric identification will become at least part 
of the enforcement matrix.280 But as important as personal and 
public safety might be, harnessing AI technology for 
enforcement purposes must be carefully tailored to consider the 
negative impact on human rights and liberties.281 
 Overall, Samaritan duties are not currently likely to 
legally expand to the digital era in liberal and democratic 
societies anytime soon,282 at least not without proper safeguards 
for civil rights and liberties.283 The duty imposed in some 
jurisdictions to aid those in imminent risk in the physical world 
 
 278. See Jeong-Yong Byun & Aziz Nasridinov, supra note 217, at 752−53 
(describing a proposed system for utilizing IoT devices to detect, visualize, and 
predict crime). 
 279. While it is still uncertain to what extent enforcement agencies are 
making use of IoT wiretaps, reports indicate that the Department of Justice 
considers activating cellphones’ microphones as a legitimate practice. See 
Haber, The Wiretapping of Things, supra note 213, at 765–66; (highlighting 
the requirements that law enforcement agencies must meet to utilize wiretap 
devices and the increasing use of such devices); Declan McCullagh, FBI Taps 
Cell Phone Mic as Eavesdropping Tool, CNET (Dec. 4, 2006, 6:56 AM), 
https://perma.cc/K7VT-MJS3 (articulating the Department of Justice’s 
approval for use of the roving bug wiretapping technique to eavesdrop on the 
infamous Genovese crime family). 
 280. See generally Fretty, supra note 242 (exploring the implications of law 
enforcement use of facial recognition on privacy); see also Haber, The 
Wiretapping of Things, supra note 213, at 792−93 (discussing the potential for 
law enforcement to exploit smartification of things to combat crime). 
 281. See Haber, The Wiretapping of Things, supra note 213, at 792−93 
(describing the need to establish checks and balances on law enforcement’s 
ability to exploit personal data). 
 282. Notably, Corinne Moini argued that in the context of suspected child 
abuse or neglect, IoT companies that are covered by the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) should be obliged to report it to the state. See 
generally Corinne Moini, Protecting Privacy in the Era of Smart Toys: Does 
Hello Barbie Have a Duty to Report, 25 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 281 (2017). 
 283. See id. at 316 (discussing the privacy implications of duties to report 
abuse based on information heard by AI devices).  
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is highly contested to begin with,284 and it will likely become 
much more controversial if new technologies enter this 
equation. It will also be undesirable to a great extent to expand 
such duties in the digital era, for both online and artificial 
bystanders.285 While the reporting of both perilous situations 
and crimes committed with only AI awareness are generally 
important for safeguarding those in peril, and subsequently 
society as a whole, it is not likely that the law will play a 
substantial role in regulating such behavior, if any at all.286 
But the fact that the current legal framework—crafted to 
shape human conduct in specific physical situations—is not 
aligned with the digital world, does not mean that the internet 
must figuratively become the Wild West or a no man’s land in 
this respect. As the internet is likely to keep expanding into 
various domains of our lives,287 the frequency of online 
bystanderism could equally rise, leaving the question of 
regulating proper human conduct to non-legal means. If society 
deems online Samaritans as important, then any proper 
solution must combine the potential benefits of using 
technological developments to better safeguard personal safety 
without placing constraints on free speech or violating 
individuals’ privacy.288 This might mean Samaritan duties for 
online reporting—whether formal or informal—will be left 
mostly under the discretion of users, platforms, and other 
indirect or informal policymaking. 
While digital Samaritan duties are not likely to be 
regulated by the law, the discussion regarding both online and 
artificial bystanders is by no means unfruitful. It sheds much 
 
 284. See supra Part II.  
 285. See supra Part III.A.2; see also supra notes 248−249 and 
accompanying text. 
 286. See supra notes 248−249 and accompanying text. 
 287. See, e.g., Katherine E. Tapp, Note, Smart Devices Won’t Be Smart 
until Society Demands an Expectation of Privacy, 56 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 83, 
89 (2017) (“[T]he [Internet of Things] embraces a reality where devices ranging 
from cell phones to wearables to our washing machines all connect to one 
another, building a huge, widely-varying network of connectivity.”). 
 288. See Montana, supra note 39, at 556 (proposing an online Samaritan 
solution wherein “[t]he reporting itself can be done anonymously to dispel any 
fears over the bystander’s privacy or personal wellbeing”). 
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light on the role that the law often assumes in shaping moral 
conduct and how it might move into the hands of platforms that 
govern much of our daily lives.289 In other words, the role of the 
law to shape the moral duties of society might become less 
effective due to the rise in the roles that both users and online 
platforms play in this regard, both likely to expand in the years 
to come. 
IV.  Samaritans and the Rise of Platform Governance 
Online platforms are becoming integral to our current 
algorithmic society. Many people use these platforms to replace 
the once-physical everyday tasks, like shopping and 
communicating, with the digital arena.290 There is little doubt 
that the way in which the architecture of these platforms is 
constructed could greatly influence human conduct,291 as 
platforms are slowly becoming a new form of governors.292 If the 
role of the state was once, inter alia, to convey and govern how 
norms and morality should be shaped in society, this role might 
partially be privatized by for-profit companies, potentially 
reshaping the ways social values are constructed.293 
 
 289. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 
292−296 and accompanying text. 
 290. See, e.g., Zaryn Dentzel, How the Internet Has Changed Everyday 
Life, in CH@NGE: 19 KEY ESSAYS ON HOW THE INTERNET IS CHANGING OUR LIVES 
235, 240 (6th ed. 2014) (“In almost everything we do, we use the Internet. 
Ordering a pizza, buying a television, sharing a moment with a friend, sending 
a picture over instant messaging.”). 
 291. Lawrence Lessig argued that “code is law” and that architectures 
regulate behavior much prior to the current rise of platform governance. See 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 120–37 (2006) (asserting that the 
internal architecture of cyberspace “constitute[s] a set of constraints on how 
[users] can behave,” directly comparable to “real-space” regulations of human 
behavior such as the taxation of cigarettes to reduce human consumption and 
the enforcement of social norms). 
 292. See Klonick, supra note 274, at 1662–64 (conceptualizing modern 
platforms’ moderation schemes, terms of use policies, role in democracy, and 
reflection of social norms as forms of governance). 
 293. See, e.g., Laura DeNardis & Andrea Hackl, Internet Governance by 
Social Media Platforms, 39 TELECOMM. POL’Y 761, 766 (2015) (citing Twitter’s 
temporary suspension of a journalist’s account during the 2012 Olympics as 
demonstrative of “the power private companies have in determining the 
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In the context of Samaritan duties, the analogy of 
livestreaming crimes to real-time crimes could well serve as a 
vital example of how online platforms will shape or mirror the 
boundaries of morality in an algorithmic society.294 Notably, 
however, online platforms do not operate in a vacuum.295 Aside 
from potential state interference, online platforms rely on their 
users to convey their own attitudes towards the conduct of these 
for-profit platforms who strive to preserve their consumers and 
thus must be somewhat attentive to their desires.296 
It might be preferable and efficient to have platforms and 
users negotiate the online playing field without legal 
interference, as it might be generally desirable from an 
economic and perhaps even a social perspective.297 We might not 
need new laws and regulations to keep pace with technological 
changes; rather, we need users to actively respond to the 
shaping of moral obligations that are set by platforms.298 Such 
self-regulation could aid in reframing the ways in which human 
 
conditions of participation in the public sphere”); Klonick, supra note 274, at 
1631−35 (describing the gradual development of content moderation 
guidelines from instructing moderators to remove content that produced a 
“gut” bad feeling to detailed manuals of what platforms perceive as socially 
and morally acceptable to display); Tarleton Gillespie, Platforms are not 
Intermediaries, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 198, 199 (2018) (“Companies are 
beginning to actually grapple with how best to be stewards of public culture, 
a responsibility that was not evident to them at the start.”). 
 294. See supra Parts III.A.1−2. 
 295. See Klonick, supra note 274, at 1662−64 (noting that online platform 
users both influence platforms’ internal governance and self-regulate through 
enforcement of social norms). 
 296. See id. at 1663 (“[P]olicies and rules are modified and updated 
through external input; platforms are economically subject to normative 
influence of citizen-users . . . .”). 
 297. Adam Smith has famously argued that market players acting in their 
own self-interest will react to consumers’ demand—promoting the social good. 
See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Sálvio Marcelo Soares ed., 4th ed. 2007). 
 298. As Jack Balkin acknowledged in the context of free speech, “[t]he 
problems of free speech in any era are shaped by the communications 
technology available for people to use and by the ways that people actually use 
that technology.” Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 
194, at 1151. 
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rights and liberties should be protected in this era,299 which 
might better accommodate the technological and social changes 
we have experienced since the establishment of the modern 
state. This was in fact one of the main reasonings of the court in 
the seminal interpretation of § 230 in Zeran v. America Online, 
Inc.,300 when granting broad immunity to internet service 
providers.301 Aside from the need to encourage free speech and 
e-commerce, the court recognized the congressional purposes of 
encouraging “interactive computer services and users of such 
services to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other 
offensive material.”302 
Users are seemingly well-positioned to decide how they 
react to livestreaming crimes or other streams featuring 
perilous situations, as they could react to the platform’s 
attitudes.303 Some users might feel unobligated to personally 
 
 299. See M. Todd Henderson, Why Self-Regulation of Social Media Could 
Work—The Financial Services Model, THE HILL (July 29, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/7PSP-MN7K (explaining that it’s incumbent on the internet 
industry to self-regulate in order to protect their own interest in a manner that 
aligns with the public’s interest); Klonick, supra note 274, at 1630 (remarking 
that, whether rooted in corporate responsibility and identity or economic 
reasons, the development of platforms’ content-moderation systems to reflect 
the normative expectations of users is precisely what the creation of the Good 
Samaritan provision in § 230 sought); Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic 
Society, supra note 173, at 1209–10 (comparing the new set of social 
responsibilities faced by new media companies in the twenty-first century to 
the challenges faced by American journalists in the twentieth century). 
 300. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 301. See id. at 330 (noting that the purpose of intermediary immunity in 
§ 230 was not only to protect the free speech of platform users but also to 
incentivize platforms to remove indecent content).  
 302. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(b)(4)); 141 CONG. REC. H8469–70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statements of 
Reps. Cox, Wyden, and Barton) (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 and Blumenthal 
v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998)); see Klonick, supra note 274, at 
1607–08 (explaining that the court in Zeran recognized two distinct 
congressional purposes for granting immunity under § 230: (1) as a good 
Samaritan provision to encourage interactive computer services and users to 
self-police the Internet and other offensive material, and (2) as a free speech 
protection for users). 
 303. See Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate 
Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
1435, 1436 (2011) (advocating that internet intermediaries should adopt 
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report online criminal activities, even if they otherwise lack 
cognitive biases or failures, have no doubt in the authenticity or 
time of the event, or that their actions could potentially save 
people’s lives.304 Many others likely will. If the tables were 
turned, many users would have likely desired aid in a similar 
situation or simply consider the act of assisting those in peril as 
important.305 Thus, these users could try nudging companies 
toward shaping their platforms to enable the desires of some to 
report livestreaming crimes (along with other perilous 
situations) or to even enable AI-based devices to become some 
form of guardians of personal safety.306 
In translating these desires into viable solutions, what 
seemingly will matter most will rely on users’ abilities to 
communicate their desires to platforms and other users—thus 
creating an incentive for platforms to invest and offer services 
that meet these desires. Under this assumption, users could 
demand, inter alia, that platforms at the very least enable quick 
and easy “SOS” calls within users’ smart devices, by which users 
could simply shout a trigger phrase that will automatically 
contact law enforcement agencies or merely contact a trusted 
person and equip them with data on the perilous situation at 
hand.307 Such a demand could be conveyed by users abstaining 
from using platforms that are not aligned with their moral 
 
accessible and transparent policies that educate users about their rights and 
responsibilities as digital citizens by challenging hateful speech by responding 
with counter-speech and empowering community members to enforce norms 
of digital citizenship). 
 304. See Latané & Darley, supra note 166, at 244–49 (explaining the 
potential hinderance to bystander intervention posed by bystander effect, the 
term used to describe the concept that the presence of other bystanders might 
reduce the likelihood of bystanders to intervene, and the related diffusion of 
responsibility); Swan, supra note 34, at 984–86 (examining the bystander 
effect).  
 305. See WALLACE, supra note 34, at 198 (advancing the theory that the 
bystander effect might not be fully translated into the digital era, as there is 
evidence to support the conclusion that people tend to behave kindly toward 
strangers on the internet more so than in real-life situations). 
 306. See Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 194, at 
1188 (“[Users] can use the digital public sphere to place social pressure on 
these digital platforms to modify their policies.”). 
 307. See infra notes 313–315 and accompanying text. 
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perceptions;308 communicating to other users (and the 
community as a whole) how platforms act (or misbehave), thus 
calling them out;309 using traditional media to echo their 
message, which in turn could spark a public outcry;310 or 
conveying their content and discontent in any other meaningful 
way. Platforms, in turn, might react to their users’ desires.311 
They might reshape their contractual relationships with users, 
whether they are labeled as end-user license agreements, terms 
of service agreements, or community standards, striving for an 
optimal arena for users.312 
Generally, we might witness a move of shifting Samaritan 
liabilities to self-reporting, and platforms will aid users to 
instantly report criminal activity or other forms of perilous 
situations, and thereby connect them to enforcement agencies. 
Interestingly, many companies have already made contacting 
emergency services readily accessible,313 or have even provided 
 
 308. See David G. Post, Anarchy, State and the Internet: An Essay on 
Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. 8 art. 3, para. 42 
https://perma.cc/Y3S9-LURF (PDF) (claiming corporate competition between 
individual online platforms results in a “market for rules,” which allows users 
to seek networks that have speech and conduct “rule sets” to their liking). 
 309. See Klonick, supra note 274, at 1652–53 (offering examples of 
platform policy change following collective action by users upset with platform 
policies). 
 310. See id. (remarking that while the media does not have a major role in 
changing platform policy per se, platforms have historically been responsive 
when media coverage is coupled with either the collective action of users or a 
public figure’s involvement). 
 311. See Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 194, at 
1201 (“[Platforms] champion a set of enlightened values that they believe that 
their end-users want—or should want—but they implement these values 
through bureaucracy and code without taking any sort of vote.”); Klonick, 
supra note 274, at 1666 (“[W]hile it initially seems like a positive source of 
accountability that these systems are indirectly democratically responsive to 
users’ norms, it also creates inherently undemocratic consequences.”).  
 312. See Klonick, supra note 274, at 1648–49 (illustrating this concept by 
noting that some platforms, such as Facebook, are constantly updating their 
policies in large part to reflect the norms and expectations of its users). 
 313. For instance, many of Apple’s iPhones and iWatches could be easily 
triggered to call emergency response services with a long touch of a button. 
Notably, making emergency SOS calls more accessible for users might in turn 
lead to many false positives, as the watch might accidently call these services 
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an emergency service in some instances, by which when the 
device detects danger it will ask the user whether to contact 
emergency services or not.314 Regardless of the rationales 
behind such movements, some platforms have in fact enabled 
the use of various skills, like that of Alexa Guard or an intruder 
alert, that could respond to perceived intruders by making them 
believe that someone is present in the house or even make them 
believe that Alexa has contacted emergency services.315  
Platforms have also directly reacted to livestreaming 
crimes.316 Facebook, for instance, does not allow those who 
“proclaim a violent mission or are engaged in violence” to have 
an account, which includes, inter alia, those involved in 
organized violence or criminal activity (including terrorist 
 
even without an emergency, often when the device is in repair and 
refurbishment facilities. See Sarah Buhr, Apple Devices Are Butt Dialing 911 
from its Refurbishing Facility—20 Times per Day, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 22, 
2018, 7:54 PM), https://perma.cc/6JJE-2JEL. Notably, there were many 
incidents in which individuals claim that saying “Siri, call 911” has alerted 
enforcement agencies, and thereby saved their lives. See, e.g., Yoni Heisler, 
College Student Rescued After Using ‘Hey Siri’’ to Call 911 from a Sinking Car, 
BGR (Dec. 12, 2019, 3:33 PM), https://perma.cc/FAC8-F3KU. 
 314. For instance, if an Apple Watch Series 4 or later detects a “hard fall,” 
the watch will help the user in connecting to emergency services. See Use Fall 
Detection with Apple Watch, APPLE, https://perma.cc/32FC-MAMH; see also; 
Elisha Fieldstadt, Apple Watch’s ‘Hard Fall’ Feature Automatically Calls 911 
for Hiker Stranded on Cliff, NBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2019, 9:52 AM), 
https://perma.cc/E43R-KQ9C. When the user does not respond and the watch 
detects that the user has been immobile for a minute, emergency services will 
be contacted automatically while sending the location of the user. Id. 
 315. These features are likely to expand to other devices as well, e.g., a 
smart smoke alarm that contacts the users or emergency services when it 
registers an unusual or risky heat spike, etc. These solutions, however, are 
obviously partial, as they rely on user’s awareness and knowledge of the 
existence of such services and how to operate them, but it is mainly limited in 
the way that users might be unable to even talk during the perilous situation 
or decide not to report it, and that current technology is limited in the criminal 
activities it might compute. See Alexa Can Help Guard Your Home, AMAZON 
(2020), https://perma.cc/R8BL-3RNB; Intruder Alert, AMAZON (2020), 
https://perma.cc/6P5T-B7HR (“If you think there is an intruder in your house 
this skill uses Alexa to make them think twice and encourages them to leave. 
Alexa pretends to turn on audio and video recording and also pretends to call 
the Emergency Services.”). 
 316. See Russell, supra note 196 (discussing Facebook’s reaction to the use 
of its livestreaming service to broadcast a mass shooting). 
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activity).317 Recently, Facebook also implemented a “one strike” 
rule in response to livestreaming crimes, i.e., that those who 
break its rules will be restricted from using its “Live” feature for 
a set period of time.318 
But regardless of how platforms are already responding to 
practices like livestreaming crime, the role of users in platform 
governance is a rather limited one.319 While a court 
acknowledged the importance of granting immunity for online 
platforms under § 230,320 it failed to address the pragmatic 
barriers for users’ participation in the so-called “self-policing” of 
undesired content.321 While many scholars argue that the most 
dominant factor in self-regulation  is the economic incentive of 
platforms to encourage users’ engagement in the platform, 
platforms’ decisions will also take other considerations into 
account.322 
 
 317. Community Standards, supra note 104.  
 318. Russell, supra note 196  
Facebook is cracking down on its livestreaming service after it was 
used to broadcast the shocking mass shootings that left 50 dead at 
two Christchurch mosques in New Zealand in March. The social 
network said today that it is implementing a ‘one strike’ rule that 
will prevent users who break its rules from using the Facebook Live 
service. 
 319. See Jack M. Balkin, 2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big 
Data Law and Policy: The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1227–31 (2017) (comparing the platform-user relationship 
to that of a fiduciary and noting that fiduciary relationships involve 
asymmetries of power, information and transparency); Balkin, Free Speech in 
the Algorithmic Society, supra note 194, at 1160 
The fiduciary collects sensitive information about the client that 
might be used to the client’s disadvantage. The client is relatively 
transparent to the fiduciary, but the fiduciary is not transparent to 
the client. By this I mean that the client is not well-equipped to 
understand and monitor the fiduciary’s operations. Moreover, the 
client relies on the fiduciary to perform valuable services, which the 
client cannot easily perform for themselves. 
 320. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(barring claims against online service provider under § 230 because defendant 
was only the publisher, and not the creator, of the tortious content). 
 321. See Klonick, supra note 274 at 1608–09. 
 322. See Citron & Norton, supra note 303, at 1454 (explaining that 
platforms are motivated by concerns about the potential business, moral, and 
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Platforms’ potential role as digital Samaritans, whether 
addressing livestreaming crimes or artificial bystanderism, will 
be influenced not just by their users’ attitudes but also by their 
own perspective of whether their actions constitute an optimal 
form of business and management.323 Putting surveillance 
capitalism aside, some platforms might self-regulate due to 
notions of social and corporate responsibility, which are 
increasingly on the rise.324 However, eventually, companies and 
platforms might not respond to users’ desires for other reasons, 
e.g., because the company operates in a monopolistic or an 
oligopolistic market, users lack the ability to convey their 
desires effectively to platforms, or users’ desires are in conflict 
with the platforms and their shareholders’ own desires.325 In 
other words, a variety of market failures could make users’ 
desires less important for some platforms. 
While the law will likely not play a direct role in regulating 
digital Samaritans, it might still play an indirect role in the 
shaping of platform governance, which will in turn affect the 
shaping of the algorithmic society.326 The law still governs how 
these platforms operate in general, and it also shapes human 
 
instrumental costs of digital hate); Klonick, supra note 274, at 1615, 1625–30 
(“Platforms create rules and systems to curate speech out of a sense of 
corporate social responsibility, but also, more importantly, because their 
economic viability depends on meeting users’ speech and community norms.”). 
 323. See Klonick, supra note 274, at 1615 (reasoning that platforms may 
opt to self-regulate despite § 230 immunity because some see self-regulation 
as an optimal form of business and company management). 
 324. See Citron & Norton, supra note 303, at 1455 (“Some intermediaries 
are motivated to address digital hate based on their sense of their own 
corporate social responsibility.”); Klonick, supra note 274, at 1615 
(“[P]latforms have created a voluntary system of self-regulation because they 
are economically motivated to create a hospitable environment for their users 
in order to incentivize engagement.”). 
 325. See Klonick, supra note 274, at 1668 (explaining that users are simply 
dependent on the whims of corporations, as shareholder values of maximizing 
company profits are not generally matched with user concerns over equal 
access and democratic accountability). 
 326. See Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, supra 
note 319, at 1219 (defining the Algorithmic Society as “a society organized 
around social and economic decision-making by algorithms, robots, and AI 
agents”). 
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conduct in various means, both directly and indirectly.327 One 
example of indirect regulation in the context of Samaritan 
duties is that of education.328 Perhaps as part of a general 
movement for a better digital education altogether, the state has 
acknowledged the importance of educating children, students, 
and military personnel, among others, to aid others in distress 
under what is termed as “Bystander Intervention Programs.”329 
In that way, the state attempts to shape social norms regarding 
how individuals should act in society, regardless of affirmative 
duties to report or assist, and respectively, regardless of how 
platforms govern.330 
Policymakers might also nudge companies to aid them in 
law enforcement by creating voluntary mechanisms of reporting 
by AI operators, as mentioned. They could, for instance, create 
an incentive for companies to report crimes.331 Other forms of 
incentives could also be implemented towards 
users— encouraging them to act.332 Others might argue that 
platforms regulate conduct as a method to preempt regulation, 
i.e., if these platforms fear that policymakers might impose 
 
 327. See Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 194, at 
1179 (“Often it is not even necessary for [governments] to threaten [platforms] 
directly. Jawboning sends the message that infrastructure providers should 
be patriotic and cooperate . . . Public officials may also appeal to the public to 
put pressure on infrastructure providers.”). 
 328. See Swan, supra note 34, at 981 (“Recently, thousands of schools, 
college campuses, military bases, workplaces, and other institutions have 
implemented bystander intervention training programs. These programs are 
meant to address and prevent social harms like bullying, sexual misconduct, 
and harassment.”). 
 329. For more on these programs, see id. at 981–84. 
 330. See id. at 983 (arguing that bystander intervention programs “try to 
change social norms so that people are more likely not to look the other way 
when others are in danger”). Notably, these intervention programs go back to 
the question of liberty and autonomy within the no-duty-to-rescue common 
law rule, thus creating “a competing norms problem.” Id. at 1003. For more 
drawbacks of bystander intervention programs, see id. at 1003–06. 
 331. Some argue that crafting such incentive program for humans would 
be morally inappropriate. See Kang, supra note 60, at 382 (asserting that such 
incentives for crime deterrence has led to the neglect of “traditional, 
culpability-based limits in criminal punishment, thereby eroding the value of 
fairness and proportionality”). 
 332. See Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 147 (suggesting that the 
state can incentivize, thus encourage, individuals to voluntary report crimes). 
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affirmative duties on them that do not align with their business 
models or other perceptions of their platform, they might 
respond to policymakers’ desires and use self-regulation to 
achieve similar purposes of otherwise obligatory duties.333 Here, 
the law regulates the behavior of platforms, without actual 
legislation or other official regulatory means.334 
Perhaps the most important role that policymakers should 
play is that of better equipping users with proper tools to 
strengthen their position in negotiation with platforms. They 
must ensure that the public has relevant knowledge and proper 
access to data regarding platforms’ terms of service or 
community standards, as it will otherwise be difficult for them 
to be a part of platform reshaping.335 As such, while 
transparency is often associated with various state actions, the 
new governance powers of platforms must push policymakers to 
extend transparency requirements far beyond any general 
public companies’ requirements often linked with economic 
reasons.336 In cases where policymakers realize that platforms 
are engaged in active enforcement, society members must have 
proper transparency over the latter’s decisions and actions. 
Lacking meaningful regulatory intervention, platform 
governance will likely shape or reshape Samaritan duties, even 
if those are not imposed by the “traditional” law. These new 
Samaritan regulations extend far beyond the regulation of a 
particular conduct and instead represent how the internet 
greatly changed human conduct and the role that platforms and 
users play within the formation of this rather new 
 
 333. See Klonick, supra note 274, at 1615 (summarizing and discussing the 
forces that motivate private actors to self-regulate). 
 334. See id. (explaining that some platforms decide to self-regulate as an 
attempt to disincentivize governments from regulating them). 
 335. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1249, 1301–13 (2008) (advocating that platforms should voluntarily take 
up a commitment to a “technological due process,” a model that understands 
the trade-offs of “automation and human discretion,” protects individuals’ 
rights to notice and hearings, and gives transparency to rulemaking and 
adjudication). 
 336. For more on current financial transparency requirements of public 
companies, see Public Companies, INVESTOR.GOV, https://perma.cc/8HFW-
U4W9. 
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community.337 Perhaps it is not the role of the law to educate 
humans in some contexts, leaving it to the discretion of 
platforms and users to shape the environment in which they 
digitally live and operate. Some might even take this argument 
further, arguing that online behavior of reporting might 
increase reporting of real-world crimes, thus making bad 
Samaritan laws unnecessary.338 Under this argument, platform 
governance could also shape human conduct in physical 
interactions. 
 Platform governance, in this respect, is not solely reserved 
to the role of rule-enforcers, but rather mostly to the role of 
rule-makers. When crafting and enforcing their terms of use or 
community standards, these platforms decide what should 
constitute proper behavior.339 Take, for example, Facebook’s 
response to livestreaming crimes via its “one strike” rule, 
referring to such act as an “offense.”340 The use of the 
terminology “offense” to describe a violation of community 
standards—or the “law”—implies how platforms view their role 
of policy making, actively shaping human conduct.341 This form 
 
 337. For a detailed analysis of platform governance, see Klonick, supra 
note 274, at 1630–69. 
 338. See WALLACE, supra note 34, at 192 (stating that bystander effect 
might not be fully translated into the digital era, as there is evidence to 
support the conclusion that people tend to behave kindly toward strangers on 
the internet more so than in real-life situations). But see Kaufman, supra note 
18, at 1390 (“Due to the advent of social media and mobile devices, however, 
fourth parties also should carry an obligation to report, perhaps as much of a 
responsibility as third parties.”); Benzmiller, supra note 18, at 960 (explaining 
that individuals in jurisdictions where duties to rescue are legally required are 
more likely to regard such duties as morally required). 
 339. Platforms will likely include their right to enforce the policies that 
they formed. See, e.g., Fitbit Privacy Policy, supra note 228 (“[W]e may use the 
information to . . . protect against fraud and abuse, respond to a legal request 
or claim, conduct audits, and enforce our terms and policies.”). 
 340. Facebook Vice President of Integrity Guy Rosen was quoted saying 
“[f]rom now on, anyone who violates our most serious policies will be restricted 
from using Live for set periods of time—for example 30 days—starting on their 
first offense. For instance, someone who shares a link to a statement from a 
terrorist group with no context will now be immediately blocked from using Live 
for a set period of time.” See Russell, supra note 196 (emphasis added). 
 341. For more on the potential linguistic effects of associating terms from 
the criminal realm to describe unauthorized use or civil law violations, see 
HABER, supra note 78, at 142–47. 
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of platform education must not be waived quickly, as it could 
shape individuals’ perceptions of governance and rulemaking.342 
Platforms’ decisions also shape much of our free speech and 
privacy rights.343 But leaving it up to platforms to decide on how 
human rights and liberties are protected might be dangerous, or 
at least, prove to be a slippery slope.344 It would be utopian, to 
some extent, if all users’ preferences were fully translated into 
community standards—agreeable by both the platforms and all 
users.345 But there are many barriers for such a utopian reality, 
and perhaps mainly, the fact that these platforms generate their 
community standards by themselves with little influence by 
their users due to technological momentum,346 will not likely 
advance platforms to make good decisions with respect to 
human rights and liberties. 
One of the biggest fears regarding platform governance is 
that of the lack of procedural safeguards and meaningful 
oversight and transparency.347 This is part of the legislative 
responsiveness, or tradeoff, to the averseness and 
liberty-restrictive elements of criminal proceedings.348 But if 
these rather new informal forms of governance impose penalties 
that society considers as more aversive than criminal law, then 
at least similar safeguards must be placed within the 
 
 342. See id. 
 343. See Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 194, at 
1153 (“[O]ur practical ability to speak is subject to the decisions of private 
infrastructure owners, who govern the digital spaces in which people 
communicate with each other.”). 
 344. See Gillespie, supra note 293, at 212–13 (suggesting that the gift of 
safe harbor under § 230 should be paired with public obligations, including 
parameters for how moderation should be conducted). 
 345. See id. at 209 (explaining that, while the logic underlying § 230 
persists, the safe harbor afforded to social media platforms becomes 
increasingly problematic as they evolve). 
 346. See Klonick, supra note 274, at 1631–35 (describing the process by 
which Facebook established its Community Standards and the inherent 
difficulties in forming an intricate system of rules). 
 347. See Gillespie, supra note 293, at 199–200 (detailing the controversies 
surrounding content moderation on social media platforms and suggesting 
potential solutions). 
 348. See id. at 212–16 (advocating that adjustments can be made to § 230 
to balance some shared public obligations to go with the generous immunity it 
has offered to platforms). 
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governance of platforms.349 In other words, we need to have 
some form of due process to protect from arbitrary enforcement 
of community standards, akin to some extent to those granted 
by the Constitution.350 We might also need to realize that the 
use of online penalties, such as banning users, would undermine 
the values of free speech, perhaps the most dominant 
constitutional protection in American law, as users who are 
banned from services will be unable to exercise their legally 
protected right.351  
 There should be little doubt that technology will continue 
to assume more active roles in public enforcement.352 It will 
become more reliant on crime-detection and crime-prevention 
AI technologies.353 Enforcement agencies might use 
 
 349. One might argue in this respect, that the use of criminal law to 
regulate behavior, even if it is considered a misdemeanor, is considered by 
society as a more intrusive form of punishment, than those that the platform 
would impose for similar misconduct. At least on these grounds, the highest 
sanction these platforms could impose is that of banning the user from the 
services. Still, although evidence for such a claim is not currently present, 
many individuals might prefer paying a relatively small fine, even if it is 
imposed under the somewhat averseness of criminal procedures, than 
permanently losing their Facebook or other social media account, especially if 
they are dependent on these services for everyday tasks and social 
participation.  
 350. See Perrin-Smith Vance, supra note 19, at 143 (describing procedural 
due process within the Constitution). 
 351. In Packingham v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that it is 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment for states to bar registered sex 
offenders from using online social media platforms. 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 
(2017). 
 352. See, e.g., Cooperation or Resistance?: The Role of Tech Companies in 
Government Surveillance, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1722, 1722 (2018) (“[T]echnology 
companies have become major actors in the world of law enforcement and 
national security.”). 
 353. Notably, many jurisdictions have begun to use AI-based automated 
risk scoring systems within the criminal law system. See Filippo A. Raso et 
al., Artificial Intelligence & Human Rights: Opportunities & Risks, BERKMAN 
KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARV. U. 18 (Sept. 25, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/Y6S4-ATQ4 (PDF); Sungyong Kang, In Defense of the Global 
Regulation of a  “Duty to Report Crime,” 57 WASHBURN L.J. 77, 80 (2018) 
[hereinafter Kang, In Defense of the Global Regulation of a “Duty to Report 
Crime”] (“To detect and deter crime in the global-digital era, states have no 
choice but to increasingly rely on private sector actors who are often crime 
victims or facilitators, instead of frontline law enforcement officers.”). 
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sophisticated firearms and accessories that could monitor and 
record data on their discharge and use, systems that can detect 
and notify enforcement agencies when gunshots are fired in 
public or in other places,354 or other forms of smart wearables.355  
Many jurisdictions have already started to use AI combined 
with facial recognition abilities to detect ongoing or future 
crimes.356 It is also plausible that enforcement agencies will use 
AI technology not merely in public places but indoors as well, 
e.g., to detect gunshots fired within a house.357 If these 
technologies are available for use by the public, then it will be 
difficult to restrict law enforcement agencies from using them 
as well.358 Thus, with the advancement of AI technologies, there 
will be little escape from the strengthening of the 
technology-enforcement paradigm. 
 
 354. See, e.g., Chip Cutter, Companies Roll Out Gunshot Detectors at the 
Office, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://perma.cc/Q2DS-K69B 
(stating that some corporations worried about workplace shootings are 
installing gunfire-detection systems in U.S. offices and factories).  
 355. See Colin Neagle, How the Internet of Things is Transforming Law 
Enforcement, NETWORKWORLD (Nov. 3, 2014, 6:33 AM), 
https://perma.cc/JWM3-CZDM (detailing the ways the Internet of Things is 
starting to make waves in law enforcement, from “connected guns that 
remember exactly when and how they were fired to wearable smart devices 
designed for police dogs”). 
 356. One example is Dubai’s “Oyoon” project, where CCTV cameras 
equipped with AI and facial recognition tools are used to monitor criminal 
behavior in tourism, traffic, and brick and mortar facilities. See Ali Al Shouk, 
How Dubai’s AI Cameras Helped Arrest 319 Suspects Last Year, UAE (Mar. 
18, 2019, 10:52 PM), https://perma.cc/3XMM-UC8J. 
 357. See Stephen Shankland, How the Internet of Things Knows Where 
Gunfire Happens, CNET (July 27, 2014, 4:00 AM), https://perma.cc/US8W-
FY6W (“SST is expanding its services so it can detect not just outdoor 
shootings, but also indoor incidents . . . .”). 
 358. In 2001, the Supreme Court considered whether aiming an infrared 
thermal imaging device—not generally available for public use—to determine 
the amount of heat emanating from the suspect’s home violates the Fourth 
Amendment. The Court held that the use of a technology that is not in general 
use violates the Fourth Amendment when it yields “details of the home that 
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.” See 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 40 (2001); see also Orin S. Kerr, The 
Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case 
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 802 (2004) (discussing the implications of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo).  
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 As the complete exclusion of technology from enforcement 
efforts is both undesirable and nonpragmatic, the role of the 
platforms that produce and govern these technologies when 
applied within the criminal realm must at least be governed as 
well. Essentially, how policymakers react to platform 
governance will greatly depend on their own interests, as will 
be shortly demonstrated through recent occurrences. 
Policymakers might, and to a certain extent, have already 
intervened to directly regulate platforms when these 
accumulate too much power and influence over their users.359 
The potential strengthening of the user-platform relationship 
might also lead the state to act on its own behalf—reducing the 
powers of platforms to govern. If companies will continue to 
fight for their users against the “traditional state,”360 much like 
we have witnessed in the so-called Apple-FBI case and others,361 
then we might witness such regulatory backlashes, which has 
recently been in fact on the move. 
 Such a regulatory backlash is in fact already on the move. 
Responsive to various moves by media giants, at least some 
United States policymakers began to actively seek ways that 
would restrain or reduce the powers of online platforms, and 
perhaps especially, that of social media companies.362 One 
 
 359. See Klonick, supra note 274, at 1650–51 (explaining that platform 
architecture has been informed by and subject to government interference, 
which can be through the more direct need to comply with local laws and 
jurisdictions, or by the more subtle influences of government lobbying and 
requests). 
 360. See id. at 1664 (arguing that platforms “have often pushed back 
against government requests for takedown”). 
 361. Under what was termed by many as the Apple-FBI Standoff, Apple 
refused to aid the FBI in access to an encrypted iPhone used by the San 
Bernardino mass shooter, due to free speech and privacy concerns of its other 
users. Eventually, the FBI was able to get assistance from a third party. See 
In re An Apple iPhone Seized During Execution of a Search Warrant on a 
Black Lexus IS300, Cal. L, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401, at *1–2 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 16, 2016); In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); 
Haber, The Wiretapping of Things, supra note 213, at 772–73. 
 362. See Jeffrey D. Neuburger, Commerce Dept. Petitions FCC to Issue 
Rules Clarifying CDA Section 230, NAT’L L. REV. (July 30, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/AHM8-HF39 (discussing the petition submitted by the 
Commerce Department to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
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recent move was triggered, at least partially, by a feud between 
the President of the United States and Twitter, and was 
directed at curbing the protections afforded by § 230.363 In 
response to Twitter’s actions, Donald Trump signed an 
Executive Order (EO) aimed to address what he deemed “online 
bias” in the form of censorship of opinions not held by the 
platforms themselves.364 Under justifications of preserving 
freedom of expression and public discourse, the EO tasks federal 
agencies with reinterpreting and clarifying § 230, including its 
requirement for an action “taken in good faith,” so as to narrow 
the protection granted to online platforms by it, in the 
advancement of the policy described and the spirit expressed by 
the EO.365 The EO further seeks to deny online platforms of 
federal funds paid for marketing and advertising on online 
platforms, should the latter engage in speech restrictions and be 
considered “problematic vehicles for government speech due to 
viewpoint discrimination, deception to consumers, or other bad 
practices.”366 
 
which requested the FCC initiate a rulemaking to clarify the provisions of 
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act). 
 363. In a series of events, some of President Trump’s tweets were labeled 
as “misleading” and applied a fact-check by the platform, while others were 
labeled as violating platform policy against abusive behavior and the 
glorifying of violence and their exposure and further dissemination were 
restricted. See Rishi Iyengar & Donie O’Sullivan, Twitter Temporarily 
Restricted Trump Campaign’s Ability to Tweet Over False COVID-19 Claims, 
CNN BUS. (Aug. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/96XG-RFQ3. In response, Twitter 
has removed content and restricted the Presidential campaign’s account. See 
id.; Makena Kelly, Twitter Labels Trump Tweets as ‘Potentially Misleading’ 
for the First Time, VERGE (May 26, 2020, 6:04 PM), https://perma.cc/67NA-
U6B8; Donie O’Sullivan, Twitter Puts Warning on Trump Tweet for ‘Threat of 
Harm’ Against DC Protesters, CNN BUS. (June 23, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/P25K-2WTC; Jon Porter, Twitter Restricts New Trump Tweet 
for ‘Glorifying Violence’, VERGE (May 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/SR4P-VU5A. 
 364. Exec. Order No. 13925, 28 Fed. Reg. 34079 (June 2, 2020). 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. Accordingly, and despite the EO being challenged in court as 
unconstitutional, the Department of Justice has moved forward with 
recommendations to reform § 230, and the Commerce Department has 
submitted a petition to the FCC to clarify the section’s provisions. See 
Neuburger, supra note 362 (detailing the increasingly “turbulent” currents 
around the Communications Decency Act); Makena Kelly, Donald Trump 
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Another move could be located within the rubric of 
competition and antitrust law. Following an investigation into 
competition in the digital marketplace, meant to determine 
whether the market’s dominant platforms had amassed their 
powers through potentially anti-competitive means,367 a 
congressional hearing opened with cautioning against the power 
 
Signs Executive Order Targeting Social Media Companies, VERGE (May 28, 
2020, 4:32 PM), https://perma.cc/9HRZ-D6K5 (reporting that President Trump 
signed an executive order to strip liability protection from companies that 
censure content following a “spat” between the President and Twitter); CDT 
Suit Challenges President’s Executive Order Targeting First Amendment 
Protected Speech, CTR. DEMOCRACY & TECH. (June 2, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/M3ZW-GFRT (stating that the Center for Democracy & 
Technology filed a lawsuit against President Trump’s Executive Order on 
Preventing Online Censorship, arguing that the Executive Order violates the 
First Amendment by curtailing and chilling the constitutionally protected 
speech of online platforms and individuals). Several more bipartisan reform 
bills meant to update § 230 have been introduced and further debated, 
including the PACT Act, which aims to enhance transparency regarding 
content moderation and to hold companies accountable for content which 
violates their own policies or is illegal. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SECTION 
230— NURTURING INNOVATION OR FOSTERING UNACCOUNTABILITY? KEY 
TAKEAWAYS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2020), https://perma.cc/E789-W3CY 
(PDF) (analyzing § 230 and concluding that the “time is ripe” to realign the 
scope of the statute with the realities of the modern internet); Schatz, Thune 
Introduce New Legislation to Update Section 230, Strengthen Rules, 
Transparency On Online Content Moderation, Hold Internet Companies 
Accountable for Moderation Practices, SENATE.GOV (June 24, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/PCS9-CEG7 (discussing the aims of the Platform 
Accountability and Consumer Transparency Act, new bipartisan legislation to 
update § 230 by strengthening transparency in the process online platforms 
use to moderate content and hold those companies accountable for content that 
violates their own legal policies or is illegal). 
 367. See Tony Romm, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google Grilled on 
Capitol Hill Over Their Market Power, WASH. POST (July 29, 2020, 6:55 PM), 
https://perma.cc/BDX9-9UQ9 (stating that Congress opened an investigation 
of Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google in 2019 aiming to explore “whether 
the tech industry’s most influential quartet of companies had attained their 
status through potentially anti-competitive means”). 
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wielded by these platforms,368 and during which, content 
moderation practices were also inquired upon.369  
The third potential move against platform governance could 
stem from national security aspects. A recent example is that of 
the popular Chinese-owned TikTok platform that has raised 
concerns with the Trump Administration regarding the Chinese 
government’s influence over content moderation and access to 
United States’ users’ data, and was met with an EO that bars 
companies from engaging in any transactions with TikTok and 
its parent company, while citing national security reasons for 
such move.370 
With much uncertainty regarding the future of these 
moves, the regulatory pushback has yet to bear any meaningful 
fruits with regard to reining in platform governance.371 Until 
these and similar efforts come to fruition, platforms will 
continue to govern users’ behavior. Such platform governance 
will greatly shape how Samaritans, or other actions once solely 
within the prerogative of the state, are regulated. The moral 
duties of society will thus be greatly shaped by platforms. As 
long as users will be limited in conveying their moral attitudes 
to platforms, and regulators abstain from imposing meaningful 
 
 368. See Adi Robertson, Everything You Need to Know From the Tech 
Antitrust Hearing, VERGE (July 29, 2020, 1:10 PM), https://perma.cc/S47T-
Q22U (detailing the congressional antitrust hearing, where the CEOs of four 
of the world’s biggest tech companies endured a five-plus-hour 
cross-examination filled with combative and accusatory questioning).  
 369. See Neuburger, supra note 362 (discussing the need for provider to 
clarify their content modification practices). 
 370. See Tyler Sonnemaker, Trump Just Issued 2 Executive Orders Aimed 
at Chinese-Owned Apps, Barring US Companies from Doing Business with 
TikTok Parent Company ByteDance and Messaging App WeChat, BUS. INSIDER 
(Aug. 6, 2020, 9:49 PM), https://perma.cc/ZPE2-TU3R; Paige Leskin, Trump’s 
Push to Ban TikTok in the US, Explained in 30 Seconds, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 8, 
2020, 12:40 PM), https://perma.cc/87B5-HRVG; Nikki Carvjal & Caroline 
Kelly, Trump Issues Orders Banning TikTok and WeChat from Operating in 
45 Days If They Are Not Sold by Chinese Parent Companies, CNN POLITICS 
(Aug. 7, 2020, 7:26 PM), https://perma.cc/Z25K-C2R7. 
 371. See Jeffrey D. Neuburger, The Communication Decency Act and the 
DOJ’s Proposed Solution: No Easy Answers, NAT’L L. REV. (June 19, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/6NXR-UL32 (stating that while critics of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) raise valid concerns, the CDA’s 
protections are extremely important for organizations that operate websites, 
mobile apps, social media networks, and other online services). 
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liability on these platforms, the future of not merely Samaritan 
laws but public enforcement altogether might be shaped almost 
solely by these platforms. The impact on human rights and 
liberties in this context might also be enhanced with the 
potential use of new virtual worlds, which might require 
reevaluating how rights and liberties are manifested within 
these new social environments, in addition to new rights and 
duties that may be created.372 Thus, it must constantly be on the 
agenda of policymakers, the media, and users, to join forces 
against the current and emerging threats of platform 
governance to individuals rights and liberties, and the 
reconstruction of society. 
V.  Conclusion 
AI technology will likely reshape many forms of human 
conduct, including law enforcement. Law enforcement agencies 
will continue to use technology to detect criminal activities, as 
long as the legal framework enables such use. Still, it is highly 
doubtful that current Samaritan duties, applicable in the 
physical world, will be fully translated into the digital world, 
imposing affirmative duties on individuals or AI platforms and 
services to report or aid those in perilous situations. The 
negative effects of and pragmatic barriers to such duties are 
simply too high. But the law is merely one form of behavior 
regulation, thus the lack of a legal requirement does not rule out 
the role that online platforms and users are already playing in 
shaping the moral landscape of communication technologies. 
The idea behind Samaritan statutes is not dead yet, and the 
ways in which society and online platforms will react to new 
emerging threats will have a great impact on the social 
perception of the online community. 
 But the most prominent Samaritans in the digital era are 
likely to be the platforms that either enable livestreaming 
crimes or have the ability to detect criminal activities or other 
perilous situations in real time. How they will use their great 
 
 372. One example is Facebook purchasing Oculus to grant its users new 
forms of social media within the realm of virtual reality. See Casey Newton, 
Oculus Will Add New Social Features Powered by Facebook, VERGE (Sept. 25, 
2019, 2:11 PM), https://perma.cc/CNY8-PAC3. 
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abilities will depend on various factors—driven mostly by 
market forces and users’ attitudes. The problem, however, is 
that the powers of such platforms, translated into new forms of 
governance, already shape the ways human rights and liberties 
are constructed. When platform governance is generally 
excluded from the legal framework set to protect these human 
rights and liberties and lacking proper transparency or 
meaningful oversight on their rulemaking, the foundations of 
liberal democracies might be at risk. Without any form of 
meaningful intervention, either legal or social, platforms will 
govern more and more aspects of our lives, leading us well into 
living within an algorithmic state. These platforms will likely 
become the new Samaritans of the algorithmic society. 
 
 
